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RETHINKING FUTURE ADVANCE
MORTGAGES: A BRIEF FOR THE
RESTATEMENT APPROACH
GRANT S. NELSONt
DALE A. WHITMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF
FUTURE ADVANCE PRIORITY

In many land financing transactions it is commercially advantageous to enter into a present mortgage even though a significant
portion of the loan funds is not to be advanced to the mortgagor
until some future date.' The most common examples are construction loans and other loans to improve real property, in which most
or all of the funds are advanced in installments as work progresses
t Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles.
* Guy S. Anderson Professor of Law, Brigham Young University.
1. See, e.g., GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW § 12.7 (3d ed. 1993); Ryan P. Dyches, Comment, Priority Disputes In Future Advance Mortgages: Picking the Winner in Arizona, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 537-38; Benjamin E. Griffith & Crane D. Kipp, Comment, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances: Problems of Priority and the Doctrine of Economic Necessity, 46 Miss. LJ. 433, 435-36
(1975); James B. Hughes, Jr., Future Advance Mortgages: Preserving the Benefits and
Burdens of the Bargain, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1008, 1101 (1994); Robert Kratovil &
Raymond J. Werner, Mortgages for Construction and the Lien Priorities Problem-The
"Unobligatory" Advance, 41 TENN. L. REV. 311, 311 (1974); Harry E. Meek, Mortgage
Provisions Extending the Lien to Future Advances and Antecedent Indebtedness, 26 ARK.
L. REV. 423, 424-25 (1973); Larry Skipworth, Should Construction Lenders Lose Out on
Voluntary Advances If a Loan Turns Sour?, 5 REAL EST. LJ. 221, 222 (1977); Norman
T. Smith & Charles M. Cobbe, Questions of Priority Between Mechanics' Lienors and
Construction Loan Mortgagees, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 8-9 (1977); Edmund T. Urban, Future
Advances Lending in North Carolina, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 297, 298 (1977); Leland
E. Rolfs, Note, Consumer Law-Limitations on the Validity of Future Advance Clauses in
Mortgage Contracts, 23 KAN. L. REV. 745, 746-47 (1975).
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and the property increases in value.2 Another illustration is the
"home equity" loan, usually a junior mortgage in which the parties
contemplate a series of future advances to fund a variety of the
mortgagor's personal financing needs. The use of this device has
become especially popular because the Tax Reform Act of 1986
and subsequent legislation permit the deduction of consumer interest only when a loan is secured by the borrower's home.3 As a
result, there is a significant incentive for homeowners to place
liens on their homes to secure loans for the acquisition of automobiles and other personal property that otherwise would not have
to be secured by home mortgages.4 Other important transactions
involving future advances include mortgages to secure commercial
lines of credit established with banks and other institutional lenders,5 "open-end" mortgages, 6 mortgages to secure letters of credit,
guarantees, or accommodations of commercial paper to be issued
by the mortgagor, and mortgages issued to secure a corporate
bond issue or a series of issues.7
The advantages of such arrangements, under which the mortgagor takes none or only a portion of the loan at the outset but

2. See NELSON & WHrTMAN, supra note 1, § 12.1; George Lefcoe & Mark Schaffer,
Construction Lending and the Equitable Lien, 40 S. CAL L. REV. 439, 439 n.1 (1967).
3. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (1988); Julia P. Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream:
A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing,
69 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 1994).
4.
It is unclear whether the home equity deduction encourages homeowners to
borrow when they otherwise would not, but it is certain that homeowners are
using the home equity loan vehicle for borrowing that might be unsecured or
secured by collateral other than a home .... Homeowners have attempted to
take full advantage of the tax deduction by converting outstanding debt to
home equity debt and by using the home equity loan vehicle for additional
borrowing where possible.
Forrester, supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 6405 (1991) (facilitating the use of mortgages to secure revolving lines of consumer credit); Peterson Bank v. Langendorf, 483
N.E.2d 279, 282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (discussing consideration for a commercial line of
credit mortgage); McDaniels v. Colvin, 16 Vt. 300, 304-05 (1844) (holding that a mortgage deed can provide for future accruing amounts); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 2.1 cmt. a, illus. 4 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991).
6. See Comment, The Open-End Mortgage-Future Advances: A Survey, 5 DEPAUL
L. REV. 76 (1955); Note, Refinements in Additional Advance Financing: The "Open End"
Mortgage, 38 MINN. L. REv. 507 (1954); infra text accompanying notes 34-36.
7. See, e.g., In re Sunflower State Ref. Co., 183 F. 834 (D. Kan. 1911) (concerning
issue of bonds under a mortgage as collateral security by a bankrupt corporation); Appeal of Reed, 16 A. 100 (Pa. 1888) (allowing issue of bonds); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY-SECURrrY (MORTGAGES) § 2.1 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991).
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receives the balance in the future, are substantial. The mortgagor
saves interest on the unadvanced portion until it is needed and
avoids the need to invest this portion at an interest rate that at
least equals the rate being paid to the lender. Moreover, both
parties avoid the expense and paperwork inherent in refinancing
the initial loan or in executing a series of junior mortgages to
secure each advance. Finally, in the construction loan context,
before committing large sums of money to the project, the mortgagee has the advantage of assurance that loan funds are being
used for construction purposes and not being diverted for impermissible uses, that construction is progressing satisfactorily, and
that the growth in value represented by the construction is reasonably adequate to secure the additional advances.
Despite the usefulness of mortgages to secure future advances,
problems related to the priority of such advances have long
proved perplexing to courts,' legislatures, 9 and commentators. 10
8. See, e.g., National Bank v. Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20, 29 (Wash. 1973), in
which the court recognized the ambiguity inherent in the application of the traditional
common law rule, discussed infra note 27 and accompanying text, distinguishing between
optional and obligatory advances: "[I]n a given case there may be difficulty in ascertaining from the circumstances and the language of the mortgage and loan papers covering
the whole agreement whether the advances are to be regarded as optional or mandatory. . . ...
9. The Missouri General Assembly has taken the matter more seriously than most
legislatures but has found the drafting of a properly functioning statute challenging.
Missouri's statute, enacted in 1981, was amended in 1984, 1991, and 1994. See Mo. REV.
STAT. § 443.055 note (Vernon 1994).
10. See sources cited supra note 1. Most adverse comment centers on the uncertainties of the distinction between optional and obligatory advances, discussed infra note 27
and accompanying text. The following comments are representative:
An additional difficulty with basing the rules of priority on the operation of the
recording system is that it is often not clear from recorded instruments whether
advances in particular cases are obligatory. The Ohio Supreme Court has twice
declined to decide whether mortgagees are required to refer in their recorded
instruments to their obligations to make future advances ....
Smith & Cobbe, supra note 1, at 10;
That the ritualistic obligatory-optional advances rule, with its "deep pocket"
protection of local tradesmen and suppliers against financial institutions . . . can
stifle development is obvious .... The obligatory-optional test operates uniformly and poorly to discourage many necessary construction projects. Moreover, the test gives rise to much litigation, yielding inconsistent and often surprising results in light of the language of the statutes.
Kratovil & Werner, supra note 1, at 321;
The rationales offered to support the existing priority rule are not valid. Basing
priority upon economic compulsion, so that the lender has priority on all prudent advances, would increase the lender's incentive to complete the project
without eliminating any necessary protection for the other participants in the
construction process.
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The traditional common law approach to these problems, which
distinguishes between obligatory and optional advances, has proved
inadequate and should be discarded. We will describe this approach and analyze its deficiencies. In its place, we will propose
an alternative approach that is embodied in a tentative draft of
the Restatement (Third) of Property-Security (Mortgages),"
which accords all future advances the priority of the original mortgage, but under which the mortgagor may give the mortgagee a
notice terminating the effect of the mortgage's future advances
clause. We believe the Restatement solution will work fairly and
efficiently for all parties and will facilitate the flow of mortgage
funds for worthwhile purposes.
II. WHY ARE FUTURE ADVANCES PROBLEMATIC?

Future advance mortgages are clearly valid between the mortgagor and the mortgagee; so long as the agreement is clear as to
what debts are secured by the mortgage, a court should have no
reservations about enforcing it. 2 Major problems arise, however,
Skipworth, supra note 1, at 241.
Professor Gilmore freely admitted that the law of future advance priority was a
morass of confusion, but he argued that confusion has its advantages: "There is...
much to be said for having no rule at all, or only a make-believe rule, and for letting
the judges decide: judges are not necessarily wiser than other people, but they are paid
to decide things." GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §

35.4, at 930 (1965). We are not convinced.
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) §§ 2.1-2.3 (Ten-

tative Draft No. 1, 1991). Subsections 2.3(a) and 2.3(b), the core of the present proposal,
contain the following text:
(a) If a mortgage secures future advances, all such advances have the
priority of the original mortgage. Whether or not a mortgage secures future
advances, if the parties have agreed that the mortgage secures interest, costs of
collection or foreclosure, or attorneys' fees, these items have the priority of the
original mortgage.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), the mortgagee must comply with
a request made at any time by the mortgagor
(1) to refrain from making further advances and thereby to terminate
the operation of the mortgage as to further advances; or
(2) to subordinate the priority of the mortgage, as against intervening
interests, with respect to further advances.
The mortgagee's duty to comply with such a request exists even if the request
violates a contractual obligation of the mortgagor to draw further advances, but
the mortgagor may be liable in damages for breach of such an obligation. The
mortgagee must provide the mortgagor with a certificate in recordable form
stating that such a request has been honored. If the mortgagor requests a subordination with respect to further advances, the mortgagee may elect to treat
the request as one to refrain from making further advances.
12. Cases enforcing parties' agreements that a mortgage will secure additional ad-
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when a third party enters the picture, typically as a junior
mortgagee, and perhaps less frequently as a subordinated
mechanic's lienor, lessee, or other interest holder. If such parties
acquire their interests voluntarily, they are naturally concerned
with the balance on the debt secured by the mortgage to which
they will be subordinate. For example, a grantee who buys mortgaged property and takes subject to (or assumes) an existing mortgage routinely obtains from the mortgagee a "payoff letter," "estoppel statement," or other document in which the mortgagee
states the current balance outstanding on the mortgage debt. 3
The price the grantee will pay for the real estate is then adjusted
to reflect that balance. 4
Much the same process is employed by lenders that take
junior mortgages on real estate. Such lenders typically establish as
a matter of policy certain "target" aggregate loan-to-value ratios
that they will not exceed. 5 A junior mortgagee can compute such
vances include Industrial Supply Corp. v. Bricker, 306 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Potwin State Bank v. J.B. Houston & Son Lumber Co., 327 P.2d 1091 (Kan.
1958); House of Carpets, Inc. v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 514 P.2d 611 (N.M. 1973). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 2.1 (Tentative Draft No.

1, 1991), providing that any agreement between mortgagor and mortgagee stating that the
mortgage will secure future advances will be enforced as between those two parties. It is
not necessary that the agreement appear in the mortgage itself; a side agreement suffices.
13. Several jurisdictions have statutes mandating that senior mortgagees provide information on the outstanding balance of their loans to interested parties. See CAL. Cwr.
CODE § 2943 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-8a, -10a (West 1994); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 535B.11 (West Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 55 (West
1991); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 274a (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1994); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 7, § 6610 (Supp. 1994-1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-25.2-26 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 57-15-8 (1994). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 1.6 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991), providing that mortgagees have a common
law duty to provide such information. This section of the Tentative Draft has not yet
been adopted by the American Law Institute. Controversy developed around the
reporters' recommendations as to the scope of the information to be disclosed. Discussion
of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES), 1991 A.L.I. PROC.
591-602.
14. Adjustment is usually necessary because at the time the contract of sale is executed, the parties do not know precisely what the balance of the mortgage loan will be
on the date of settlement. Assume, for example, that the contract of sale provides for a
full price of $100,000, with the buyer to take subject to an existing mortgage having a
balance of approximately $70,000. If this were the precise balance, the buyer would be
required to pay $30,000 cash at the settlement. Suppose that shortly before the settlement
date, however, the buyer obtains a statement from the mortgagee showing that the actual
balance as of the settlement date (including accrued interest) will be $70,300. The cash
required of the buyer at settlement will be decreased to $29,700 to reflect the fact that
the mortgage debt balance was higher than the parties had estimated.
15. In some cases, a governmental regulator may dictate this policy. See, e.g., Real
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a ratio only with knowledge of the balance owing on the first
mortgage. Thus, before making the junior loan, the lender obtains
from the first mortgagee a statement like that described above. If
the statement discloses that the first mortgage has a higher balmortgage
ance than the second mortgagee expected, the second
16
compensate.
to
amount,
lower
a
for
made
be
loan will
*While other takers of subordinate interests in real estate may
not be as conscientious as grantees and junior lenders in determining the precise balance of the senior debt, they are nonetheless
mindful of that balance in at least general terms. For example, a
contractor hired to construct improvements on real estate for an
owner will recognize that if the owner does not pay the contract
price when due, the contractor may need to file a mechanic's lien
to aid in its collection. Such a lien will have much greater practical value to the contractor if the prior mortgage liens are for only
a modest percentage of the value of the real estate. The greater
the mortgage balance in relation to the property's value, the less
efficacious the mechanic's lien is likely to be. Contractors may
well take this risk-assessment into account in bargaining for other
concessions from the owner.
All of the calculations and adjustments described above work
smoothly and effectively when the balance on the senior mortgage
can be definitely determined. Information about the balance, when
combined with appraisal or other information about the value of
the real estate, allows junior mortgagees and grantees to evaluate
their own interests and risks fairly precisely. These assessments are
not perfect, of course. Appraisals are only approximations and are
sometimes seriously inaccurate.17 Property values can fluctuate
Estate Lending Standards, 57 Fed..Reg. 62,890 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 12
C.F.R.) (establishing maximum real estate loan-to-value ratios for federally supervised
lending institutions); Scott A. Lindquist, Real Estate Lending Regulations: The New Ball
Game, PROB. & PROP., May-June 1993, at 11 (discussing the above-cited regulation).
16. For example, assume that the junior lender will not accept an aggregate loan-tovalue ratio in excess of 90%. If the mortgagor applies for a loan of $20,000 and represents that the first mortgage has a balance of $70,000, and if the real estate is appraised
at $100,000, the junior lender may approve the loan. However, if the payoff statement
discloses that the actual balance on the first loan is $70,300, the junior lender may reduce its loan to $19,700 to preserve the 90% aggregate loan-to-value ratio.
17. Inadequate and sometimes fraudulent appraisals have been blamed for much of
the difficulty experienced by savings and loan associations during the 1980s. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT FAILURES: COSTLY FAILURES RESULTED FROM REGULATORY VIOLATIONS AND UNSAFE PRAcTICES 33-34 (1989). In Title XI of the Financial

Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12 U.S.C.
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over time. The amount owing on the senior mortgage can increase
if interest payments are not made and interest is consequently
added to the principal, or if the mortgagee makes advances to pay
taxes, insurance, or other sums for the protection of the property
and is not reimbursed by the mortgagor.18
However, these factors are usually relatively modest in impact
and are unlikely to get out of hand without the knowledge, and to
some extent the control, of the holder of the junior interest. A
junior mortgagee can, for example, request that the senior mortgagee notify it of any default in payment. Statutes in some jurisdictions require the senior lender to honor such a request, 9 and
in others the senior lender may well voluntarily honor such a
request because of its hope that the junior will cure the default.'
The junior mortgagee can also require that tax and insurance
payments be made through an escrow account held by the junior
if the senior lender is not already maintaining such an account;
this system provides an early warning if the morigagor fails to
make the required payments. The junior lender can also minimize
the risk of waste or deterioration of the real estate by appropriate
covenants in its mortgage21 and by regular inspections.
Of course, even these problems do not arise when the junior
interest holder is a grantee rather than a subordinate lienholder.
The reason is obvious: after the real estate is sold to a grantee, if

§ 3331-3352 (Supp. IV 1992), Congress required that all states create a system for certification of appraisers who provide appraisal reports on federally related financial transactions. The effectiveness of the appraisal procedures of the Federal Housing Administration has also been questioned. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WEAKNESSES IN
HUD's SINGLE FAMILY APPRAISAL PROGRAM (1987).
18. See, e.g., Van Dusseldorp v. State Bank, 395 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Iowa 1986) (involving advances to pay property taxes); First Vt. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kalomiris, 418
A.2d 43 (Vt. 1980) (involving advances to pay prior mortgage); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 2.1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991) (involving
expenditures for protection of the security).
19. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-809 (1990) (requiring notice of foreclosure sale to
parties to a deed of trust upon properly recorded request for notice); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 2924b(b) (West 1993) (requiring that notice of default be filed in office of recorder);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.325 (Vernon 1986) (requiring notice of foreclosure sale upon
properly recorded request for notice); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-26 (1994) (requiring notice of default or sale upon properly recorded request).
20. See, e.g., Illinois State Bank v. Yates, 678 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
21. See Krone v. Goff, 127 Cal. Rptr. 390, 391 n.1 (Ct. App. 1975); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 4.6(a)(4) (Tentative Draft No. 3,
1994) (providing that mortgage covenants can expand the usual definition of waste to
give the mortgagee additional protection); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 4.11.
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a default in interest payments, a failure to pay taxes or insurance
premiums, or waste occurs, it is the grantee who is responsible for
the default. The grantee can hardly complain about the increase in
the mortgage balance that results. Hence, the primary parties with
legitimate concerns about such unexpected enlargements of the
senior mortgage balance are junior lienholders, and they are generally satisfied with the risk-reduction measures mentioned above.
However, when the senior mortgage also provides for future
advances, the risk to junior lienors is significantly increased. A
large advance by the senior lender, if it has the priority of the
original first mortgage, can so jeopardize the junior's position in
relation to the land's value that the security becomes virtually
worthless. From the viewpoint *of prospective junior lenders, this
risk must be managed carefully because the results can be devastating. Two techniques are available for coping with the risk. The
first is to insist, as a condition of making (or subordinating to) the
loan, that the senior mortgagee limit22 or completely waive the
power to make further advances with the priority of the original
lien; the second is for the junior lender to refrain from lending
altogether if the senior lender has the power to add further advances to its lien.
The first of these methods is widely used by well-advised
junior mortgagees that subordinate their interests to construction
loan mortgages. Such mortgagees are often vendors that sell land
to developers. Such a vendor can condition its subordination on
the construction lender's restricting its advances in ways that will
safeguard the vendor's junior lien. For example, the vendor's subordination agreement may impose a maximum amount and a maximum interest rate on the construction loan, may specify the nature of the improvements to be constructed, and (perhaps most

22. See United States v. South At. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 606 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (involving subordination to a first mortgage "in an amount not to
exceed $85,000"); Life Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bryant, 467 N.E.2d 277, 282 (Il1. App. Ct.
1984) (involving subordination to a first mortgage not exceeding a stated amount and
interest rate, and only for 45 days); National Bank v. Moeller, 434 N.W.2d 887, 888
(Iowa 1989) (permitting subordination only on condition that subordinating mortgagee be
provided additional collateral by mortgagor); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Wines, 474 A.2d 1360,
1361 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (involving subordination to a mortgage "from a recognized
lending institution, the proceeds of which are to be applied to the erection of improvements"), cert. denied, 481 A.2d 802 (Md. 1984); Blanton v. FDIC, 706 P.2d 1111, 1112-13
(Wyo. 1985) (involving subordination to loan not exceeding $200,000 to be used for certain specific purposes).
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importantly) may require that all advances made under the senior
loan actually be spent on "hard" construction costs that will directly enhance the value of the real estate.23 These protections
are not foolproof, but a carefully crafted agreement can give the
junior vendor significant protection.
If the junior and senior loans are arranged as part of the
same transaction, or the junior loan is arranged first (as is often
the case with the purchase-money mortgages described above),
there may be ample opportunity for negotiation of the sorts of
protection just described. However, if a senior loan permitting
future advances is already in place when the owner of real estate
approaches a prospective junior lender to apply for a new loan,
the junior lender has no opportunity to negotiate with the senior
lender about the terms of its future advances clause, for the clause
is already in place. Hence, unless that clause strictly limits the
nature and extent of possible advances, the junior lender is likely

23. See Roskamp Manley Assocs. v. Davin Dev. & Inv. Corp., 229 Cal. Rptr. 186,
187 (Ct. App. 1986) (requiring that all advances be used only "to pay for material and
labor directly incorporated" into improvements of the property); Stockwell v. Lindeman,
40 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557-58 (Ct. App. 1964) (requiring that the construction loan not exceed $80,000 and that the annual interest rate not exceed 7.5%); Peninsula Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. DKH Properties, 616 So. 2d 1070, 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (requiring
that all advances be used for hard costs "as they relate to the rehabilitation of the property"), review denied, 626 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1993). Some courts have been willing to imply
conditions to protect subordinating purchase-money mortgagees who did not negotiate
adequate protection. See Woodworth v. Redwood Empire Say. & Loan Ass'n, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 373, 383-84 (Ct. App. 1971) (interpreting an automatic subordination clause as
restricting the use of loan funds to construction and property improvements); Middlebrook-Anderson Co. v. Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 96 Cal. Rptr. 338, 347 (Ct. App.
1971) (implying the condition that loan proceeds be used only for construction purposes);
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. L & T Developers, Inc., 434 So. 2d 699, 705 (Miss.)
(holding in part that construction lender had breached his duty to landowner to exercise
reasonable diligence to see that funds loaned were in fact used for construction project
on the subject property), corrected by, 437 So. 2d 7 (Miss. 1983); Cambridge Acceptance
Corp. v. Hockstein, 246 A.2d 138, 141 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (implying condition
that construction lender would "make and administer the loan in the conventional manner of a construction lender"), certification denied, 248 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1968). For decisions refusing to imply conditions, see In re Nash, 60 B.R. 27, 31 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986)
(applying Arizona law); Home Say. Ass'n, F.A. v. State Bank, 763 F. Supp. 292, 298
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (declining to impose a condition of "cautious loan administration"); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Carriage Lane Assocs., 595 A.2d 334, 338 (Conn. 1991)
(refusing to imply conditions when parties had negotiated the matter and failed to include express conditions); Rockhill v. United States, 418 A.2d 197, 200 (Md. 1980) (declining to imply a conditional or limited subordination agreement); Tuscarora, Inc. v.
BVA Credit Corp., 241 S.E.2d 778, 782 (Va. 1978) (rejecting the reasoning of courts approving the "principle of implied conditional subordination").
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to refuse to make the loan. To take a junior position behind an
unlimited future advances provision in a senior mortgage is, as
indicated above, potentially disastrous.
From an economic viewpoint, the mortgagor may thus be
placed in an awkward and inefficient position. Suppose the value
of the real estate substantially exceeds the current balance owing
on the first mortgage, and the mortgagor would like to seek additional financing and might approach the mortgagee for a further
advance. Whether the mortgagee has any obligation to respond favorably depends on the terms of the original loan transaction. If
those terms obligate the mortgagee to lend more money (and if
any conditions to that obligation are met), the mortgagor will get
the necessary funds. However, the terms of the loan may include
no such obligation; they may provide merely that if the mortgagee
lends additional money, its repayment will be secured by the mortgage. Alternatively, the loan contract may make the mortgagee's
obligation to make further advances contigent on conditions (such
as the borrower's minimum net worth or the condition of the real
estate) that the borrower cannot meet.
In such a case, the borrower's next recourse may be to approach a different lender and seek a loan secured by a second
mortgage on the real estate. But if prospective junior lenders realize that the senior lender has the capacity to make additional
advances and to secure them with its senior priority, they will
almost certainly reject the borrower's loan application, as discussed
earlier. The risk that the security of the junior loan will become
valueless by virtue of such advances is simply unacceptable to
them. Hence the borrower is faced with a dilemma. She has substantial equity of value in the land, but cannot borrow on it from
anyone-not from a junior lender, for the reasons just discussed,
and not from the senior lender who, for whatever reasons, 24 is
disinclined to lend more, and who has no duty to do so.25
24. There are many possible reasons. The senior lender may simply be out of
lendable funds. It may have had a bad payment experience with the borrower and concluded that she is a poor risk. It may have tightened its lending policies under pressure
from federal or state regulators. It may have decided, for reasons of geographic diversification, to refrain from lending more funds in the area where the borrower's land is
located.
25. The borrower has one additional course of action, but it is often unattractive: to
refinance the first mortgage and pay it off. In some cases, that is impossible; the first
mortgage loan may be "locked in" and nonprepayable. See Dale A. Whitman, Mortgage
Prepayment Clauses. An Economic and Legal Analysis, 40 UCLA L. REV. 851, 863
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Can the borrower solve this problem by contracting with the

junior lender not to borrow additional funds from the senior? This
approach is only superficially attractive; the borrower may make

such a promise, but may also breach it by drawing additional
funds on the senior loan. If the borrower does so, the junior
lender's sole remedy is likely a suit for damages against the bor-

rower, which is apt to be of little value. What the junior lender
needs is not the borrower's promise to .refrain from borrowing, but
the senior lender's promise to refrain from lending. The junior
lender typically has no leverage to exact such an agreement from
the senior, however.
This inability to obtain junior financing is disadvantageous to
society at large as well as to the individual borrower. Free transferability is fundamental to the economic basis of private ownership of land.' Transferability and its corollary, mortgageability,
permit land to be pledged. to secure funds for development and
other economic activity, thus shifting borrowers' wealth, held in
the form of equity in land, to more productive uses. Owners' inability to borrow additional funds despite possessing substantial
equity in land impedes the construction of improvements on the
land and the commencement of other business ventures and in the
long run diminishes the net wealth of the community. Such a
result is unacceptable to society at large. One might argue that the

(1993). Alternatively, prepayment of the first mortgage may be permissible only with the
payment of an accompanying fee so high as to make the transaction infeasible. Id at
876-77. Lock-ins and prepayment fees are little-used today in single-family residence
mortgages, since the standard forms published by the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), and widely
used by nearly all home mortgage lenders, provide for free prepayment at any time. See
FNMA/FHLMC Multistate Fixed Rate Note-Single Family, reprinted in GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.

WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

app. at 1308 (4th ed. 1992) ("I have the right to make payments of principal at any time
before they are due.... I may make a full prepayment or partial prepayments without
paying any prepayment charge."). However, lock-ins and prepayment charges are still
common in mortgages on commercial and income properties. See generally Whitman,
supra. Such fees and lock-in clauses are generally enforceable. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 6.2 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1994). Finally, refinancing means giving up the benefits of the existing interest rate of the first mortgage,
perhaps in a market in which current rates are much higher. The higher debt service cost
may again make the transaction wholly unattractive.
26. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (1973) ("The
third criterion of an efficient system of property rights is transferability. If a property
right cannot be transferred, there is no way of shifting a resource from a less productive
to a more productive use through voluntary exchange.").
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borrower has created this dilemma by signing a loan agreement
permitting the first mortgagee to secure additional advances with
the mortgage but not requiring it to make them. That may well be
so, but this explanation provides no remedy for the fundamental
economic inefficiency that results.
III. THE COMMON LAW RESPONSE
The traditional common law approach to the foregoing problems, as this Article will show, has proved inadequate and should
be discarded. We will describe this approach and analyze its deficiencies, and will propose, in its place, an alternative approach
that we believe will work fairly and efficiently for all parties and
will facilitate the flow of mortgage funds for worthwhile purposes.
A. The Optional/ObligatoryAdvance Doctrine
The common law answer to this problem of inefficiency has
been what is commonly termed the optional/obligatory advance
doctrine. Originating in the English House of Lords in 1861,27 the
27. Hopkinson v. Rolt, 11 Eng. Rep. 829, 833 (1861). Cases following Hopkinson in
the United States include In re Kirk, 133 B.R. 914, 916 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (applying Ohio law); In re Johnson, 124 B.R. 648 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law); La Cholla Group, Inc. v. Timm, 844 P.2d 657 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); National
Lumber Co. v. Advance Dev. Corp., 732 S.W.2d 840 (Ark. 1987); Kimmel v. Batty, 451
P.2d 751 (Colo. 1969); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. wells, 596 P.2d 429 (Idaho 1979);
Freese Leasing, Inc. v. Union Trust & Say. Bank, 253 N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1977) (overruled by 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1272, § 1 (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 654.12A (West
1995))); Potwin State Bank v. J.B. Houston & Son Lumber Co., 327 P.2d 1091 (Kan.
1958) (providing for priority of all future advances, whether obligatory or not) (overruled
by 1971 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 190, § 1 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2336 (1993)));
Earnshaw v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 249 A.2d 675 (N.H. 1969); Goldome Realty
Credit Corp. v. Harwick, 564 A.2d 463 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989); House of Carpets, Inc. v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 514 P.2d 611 (N.M. 1973); Briarwood Towers 85th Co. v.
Guterman, 523 N.Y.S.2d 98 (App. Div. 1988); Schalmo Builders, Inc. v. Malz, 629 N.E.2d
52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Thompson v. Smith, 420 P.2d 526 (Okla. 1966); Central Pa.
Say. Ass'n v. Carpenters of Pa., Inc., 463 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1983); Kemp v. Thurmond, 521
S.W.2d 806 (Tenn. 1975); Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538 (Utah 1977); Western
Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 424 P.2d 437 (Utah 1967); National
Bank v. Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1973) (overruled by 1991 Wash. Laws ch.
281, § 23 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 60.04.226 (West Supp. 1990))); Colonial
Bank v. Marine Bank, N.A., 448 N.W.2d 659 (Wis. 1989); Poulos Inv., Inc. v.
Mountainwest Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 680 P.2d 1073 (Wyo. 1984); W.M. Moldoff, Annotation, Priority Between Mechanics' Liens and Advances Made Under Previously Executed
Mortgage, 80 A.L.R. 2D 179 (1961).
The optional/obligatory advance distinction has occasionally been modified by statute with respect to the priority of construction (mechanic's) liens. See, e.g., S.C. CODE
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doctrine holds that if a mortgagee is contractually obligated to
make advances, they will be senior to any intervening lien. On the
other hand, if future advances are optional with the mortgagee
(that is, the mortgagor has no contractual right to demand advances), and if the mortgagee has notice of an intervening lien at the
time advances are made, they lose priority to the intervening lien.
While this doctrine has the incidental effect of occasionally
promoting the priority of junior lienors, that is plainly not its purpose. Indeed, junior lienors hardly need protection or promotion,
for when they make their loans they already have notice from the
wording of the prior recorded mortgage that future advances may
be given.' Rather, the doctrine's objective is to assist the borrower in obtaining further secured financing, as outlined above. In
theory, if the mortgagor is unable to convince the first mortgagee
to make additional advances and has no legal right to demand
them, the borrower can approach a second mortgagee, explain the
situation, and borrow the funds. The junior lender will, it is presumed, be entirely willing to lend; the optional advance rule sup-

ANN. § 29-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1993) (providing that such liens will gain
priority over subsequent future advances under a prior mortgage, even if the advances
are obligatory, provided that the lien is filed of record and the prior mortgage holder is
served with notice of the lien), construed in Glover v. Lewis, 382 S.E.2d 242 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1989).
28. If the future advance agreement is not in the mortgage and is not otherwise
recorded, it seems clear enough that a junior lienor who gives value, who records, and
who has no notice of the agreement will take free of it under any reasonable construction of the recording acts. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 2.1(c) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991):
As against a person acquiring an interest in the mortgaged property subsequent
to the mortgage, future advances will be secured only if an agreement [to secure future advances] exists and (1) the mortgage states that future advances
are secured; or (2) the person has other notice of the parties' agreement concerning future advances at the time the interest is acquired; or (3) the mortgage
states a monetary amount to be secured.
See also Commercial Bank v. Rockovits, 499 N.E.2d 765, 767-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding valid security in an "open-ended mortgage" expressly referenced in agreement);
Leche v. Ponca City Prod. Credit Ass'n, 478 P.2d 347, 351 (Okla. 1970) (holding claims
for future advances by prior mortgagee, offered with actual knowledge of subsequent
obligations, inferior to claims of subsequent mortgagee that lacked notice of potential
future advances); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 12.7. The third option mentioned,
that the mortgage state a maximum amount to be secured, would seem to sufficiently
protect junior lienors even if they do not have specific notice that future advances may
be the means of bringing the mortgage balance up to that maximum. Some cases, however, give the junior lienor protection against an undisclosed future advances clause even
when the balance is below the maximum level stated. See Sadd v. Heim, 124 A.2d 522,
525 (Conn. 1956); Tyler v. Butcher, 734 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
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posedly assures the junior that its security position will not be
impaired by any subsequent advances by the senior lender.
This scenario, however, is pure theory, and it is extremely
doubtful that it plays out so nicely in practice. To be sure, junior
lenders may understand that they will have priority if the senior
lender lacks any duty to make further advances. But whether any
such advances will be optional or obligatory can, as discussed
below, be a very close question indeed. If the senior lender's duty
to make further disbursements depends on the satisfaction of various conditions, as is often the case, judging whether advances will
be optional or obligatory can involve subtle issues of both fact and
law. Junior lenders, we suggest, are rarely so eager to advance
their money that they are willing to assume the risk of loss of
priority if they are wrong in making such judgments. Rather, they
are likely to reject a junior loan application in any case in which
the "optionality" of advances on the prior mortgage is even slightly uncertain.
In our view, the optional/obligatory distinction rarely accomplishes its purpose-to ensure that a borrower with substantial equity can obtain additional financing. Unfortunately, what the doctrine does do is frustrate and confuse the legitimate needs and
expectations of senior lenders and borrowers alike. To demonstrate how this happens, we first present a brief taxonomy of
future advance loans. There are four common categories of such
loans,2 9 and the optional/obligatory advance doctrine affects each
somewhat differently.
Construction loans comprise the first category. Virtually all
new construction (and much rehabilitation) of improvements on
real estate is financed with loans that contemplate future advances.3" In construction lending the parties usually enter into an or-

29. The four types of future advance loans discussed in the text do not exhaust the
possibilities. Future advances can be useful in many other business contexts. For example,
a corporate mortgage bond indenture may encumber the corporation's real estate to secure not only an initial bond issue, but additional bonds to be issued in the future. As
another example, a long-term mortgage lender on a newly constructed office building may
disburse a portion of the loan upon completion of the project, but may reserve a
"holdback" until the building achieves a particular level of occupancy or a particular
"debt service coverage ratio" (that is, until the project's net cash flow is, for example, 1.2
times the debt service on the loan), at which time the remainder of the loan will be
funded. See Charles L. Edwards, Commercial Mortgage Loan Commitments: A Borrower's
Perspective, PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 1994, at 28.
30. See Kratovil & Werner, supra note 1, at 311.
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dinary note and mortgage, but supplement them with a "construction loan agreement" spelling out the conditions under which
advances to (or on behalf of) the borrower will be made." In
theory, the advances on a construction loan are obligatory; the
lender is committed to making them in order to complete the
planned improvements. In practice, they are often optional, for
reasons discussed below.
Line of credit loans, the second category, have fluctuating
balances. The borrower may draw down funds, repay them, and
draw them down again, within some upper dollar limit. Lines of
credit are often used by business borrowers whose financial needs
vary over time. In recent years they have also become popular
with consumers, often in the guise of "home equity" loans, which
may be secured by first or junior mortgages." As with construction loans, in principle the lender is obligated to permit the drawing of funds up to the agreed ceiling, making the advances obligatory. However, the applicable loan documents may impose conditions on the lender's duty, and if those conditions are not met the
lender can cut off further draws on the loan.3
Dragnet clauses are not really separate loan agreements at all.
Instead, a dragnet clause is often included (typically in innocuous
small print) in a mortgage loan for some entirely ordinary purpose, such as a home or business purchase. In its simplest form,
the dragnet clause states that if the borrower ever becomes liable
to the lender on any other loan, this mortgage will also secure
it? 4 In most cases the lender has made no commitment to make
any such other loan, and probably no such loan is anticipated. The
purpose of the dragnet clause is to provide a sort of contingent
cross-collateralization; if any other loan is made in the future, the
presently mortgaged real estate will serve as additional collateral

31. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 12.1.
32. See Forrester, supra note 3; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY: MANY
FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROWTH IN HOME EQUITY FINANCING IN THE 1980s

5-6 (1993).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 68-70.
34.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES)

§ 2.4(c)

(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 12.8; Rolfs, supra
note 1, at 745. See Union Bank v. Wendland, 54 Cal. App. 3d 393, 398 (1976), for a
typical dragnet clause: "This mortgage is given to secure the payment of a promissory
note [described in detail], and also the payment of any additional sums and interest
thereon now or hereafter due or owing from mortgagor to mortgagee."
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for it. Advances secured under a dragnet clause are thus virtually
always optional rather than obligatory.
Open-end mortgage clauses are the fourth category of future
advance mortgages. In substance, they provide that the mortgagee
may, at its option, make additional advances to the mortgagor in
the future, and that such advances, if any, will be secured by the
mortgage. 35 A clause may specify a maximum limit on the
amount of the future advances, or it may limit them to the original principal balance of the loan, thus permitting a borrower who
has paid down the loan balance to borrow enough to return the
loan to its original amount.3 6 An open-end mortgage clause is, in
a sense, a narrow dragnet clause; it permits the mortgage to secure future advances only if they are designated as being related
to the original mortgage, while a dragnet clause typically purports

35. Until recently, open-end clauses were commonly included in residential mortgage
forms. See, e.g., Nonuniform Covenant 21 of the District of Columbia FNMAIFHLMC
Single Family Deed of Trust, reprinted in D. BARLOW BURKE, LAW OF FEDERAL
MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS app. A at 434 (1989), which provides as follows:
Future Advances. Upon request of Borrower, Lender, at Lender's option prior
to the release of this Deed of Trust, may make Future Advances to Borrower.
Such Future Advances, with interest thereon, shall be secured by this Deed of
Trust when evidenced by promissory notes stating that said notes are secured
hereby.
This clause was enforced according to its terms in In re Hawkins, 156 B.R. 745 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 1993). The FNMA/FHLMC Multifamily Mortgage forms formerly contained identical open-end language. See the FNMAJFHLMC Texas Multifamily Deed of Trust form
reproduced in NELSON & WHrIMAN, supra note 1, § 14.16, cl. 33. However, in the past
several years the use of such clauses in both of the FNMA/FHLMC mortgage forms
mentioned above has been discontinued. Telephone Interview with John Mansfield, Vice
President and Deputy General Counsel, Federal National Mortgage Association (Sept. 9,
1994).
36. Nonuniform Covenant 33 of the Texas FNMA/FHLMC Multifamily Deed of
Trust form, reprinted in NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 1, § 14.16, cl. 33, added the
following language to that quoted in the previous footnote: "At no time shall the principal amount of the indebtedness secured by this Instrument, not including sums advanced
in accordance herewith to protect the security of this Instrument, exceed the original
amount of the Note (US$-) plus the additional sum of US$-." In at least some
jurisdictions a statement of maximum amount such as this is necessary to comply with
statutes. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-102 (1988) (requiring future advance mortgages to state a maximum amount).
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to secure any and all types of future loans.37 By its terms, an
open-end clause contemplates optional, not obligatory, advances.
Dragnet clauses and open-end clauses encounter no significant
problems with the optional/obligatory advance doctrine. Lenders
that employ these clauses have no particular expectation that advances secured by them will have the priority of the original mortgage, since the advances are so obviously optional. A lender that
makes an advance under an open-end clause realizes that it must
first conduct a title examination, and that any junior lien disclosed
by that examination will have priority over the advance it proposes to make. In other words, the open-end clause gives the lender
security, but not priority. With a dragnet clause, the lender's expectations are even more attenuated; when the subsequent loan is
made, the lender may not even be aware of the existence of the
prior mortgage containing the dragnet clause. This is particularly
likely if the subsequent loan is made by a different loan officer in
a different branch of the lending institution. In most cases, an
officer approving a subsequent loan places little reliance on a
dragnet clause. It is only when the subsequent loan is defaulted
on, and the collateral given as security for it proves to be inadequate, that the lender focuses on the dragnet clause as a sort of
deus ex machina to aid in collection. The lender does not view the

37. This is not to say that dragnet clauses actually are enforced so broadly. On the
contrary, courts often limit them to the securing of future loans of the same type or
character as the original mortgage loan. See, e.g., Lundgren v. National Bank, 742 P.2d
227, 236 (Alaska 1987), superseded by 756 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1987); Security Bank v. First
Nat'l Bank, 565 S.W.2d 623, 627-28 (Ark. 1978); Akamine & Sons, Ltd. v. American Sec.
Bank, 440 P.2d 262, 268 (Haw. 1968); Decorah State Bank v. Zidlicky, 426 N.W.2d 388,
390 (Iowa 1988); Mark Twain Kansas City Bank v. Cates, 810 P.2d 1154, 1162 (Kan.
1991); Dalton v. First Nat'l Bank, 712 S.W.2d 954, 958-59 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Canal
Nat'l Bank v. Becker, 431 A.2d 71, 75 (Me. 1981); Airline Commerce Bank v. Commercial Credit Corp., 531 S.W.2d 171, 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); First Sec. Bank v. Shiew,
609 P.2d 952, 957 (Utah 1980). Contra First Nat'l Bank v. Rozelle, 493 F.2d 1196,
1201-02 (10th Cir. 1974); In re Stone, 49 B.R. 25, 27 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); Thorp
Sales Corp. v. Dolese Bros., 453 F. Supp. 196, 200 (W.D. Okla. 1978); In re Dorsey Elec.
Supply Co., 344 F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Wong v. Beneficial Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 128 Cal. Rptr. 338, 345 (Ct. App. 1976); Fleming v. First Am. Bank & Trust Co.,
319 S.E.2d 119, 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Financial Acceptance Corp. v. Garvey, 380
N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); Rogers v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 738
S.W.2d 635, 636-37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 362
S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961); cf. Union Nat'l Bank v. First State Bank &
Trust Co., 697 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (enforcing the mortgage to secure
an unrelated debt when the terms of the mortgage expressly provided that it would cover
such debt).
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dragnet clause as a tool for achieving priority over intervening
liens.
B. Construction Loans and Optional Advances
It is with construction loan advances that the optional/obligatory advance doctrine does its greatest mischief. In this context the
lender's expectations are entirely different from those with respect
to open-end and dragnet clauses, for the lender fully expects and
intends all advances to have the priority of the original mortgage.
Indeed, preservation of this priority is essential from the viewpoint
of construction lenders. The principal reason is that in every construction project it is possible that unpaid contractors, laborers,
and materials suppliers will file statutory liens (typically termed
mechanic's liens or construction liens) on the real estate. In most
jurisdictions the original mortgage, if properly recorded, will have
priority over such liens. But if some construction advances are
denied that priority, they may end up in subordinate position to
construction liens. In a project on which those liens represent a
substantial dollar amount, any construction advances that fail to
get the priority of the original construction mortgage may be so
far subordinate as to be essentially unsecured and uncollectible.
This problem is especially acute in the many jurisdictions that
treat all individual mechanic's liens as taking their priority from
the time of commencement of the construction project rather than
from the time each individual lienor begins furnishing labor or
materials." Thus, lenders regard the preservation of priority for
all construction advances as critically important.
Under the traditional optional/obligatory advance doctrine, we
have already seen that preservation of priority requires that the
lender make no optional advances while having knowledge of intervening liens. Although superficially this seems to be a simple

38. See Dixie Heating & Cooling Co. v. Bank of Gadsden, 437 So. 2d 576, 577 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1983); M.D. Marinich, Inc. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 484 N.W.2d 738, 741
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal denied, 497 N.W.2d 184 (Mich. 1993); Schalmo Builders,
Inc. v. Malz, 629 N.E.2d 52, 53 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (construing OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 1311.13(A)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1993)); Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bohmar
Minerals, Inc., 661 P.2d 521, 523 (Okla. 1983); ROBERT KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 214 (1972). Under this view, it is immaterial whether the particular lienor's work was done before or after the mortgage was recorded. Barker's, Inc. v.
BDJ Dev. Co., 308 N.W.2d 78, 80 (Iowa 1981).
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test, in the construction lending context it is fraught with difficulties, as illustrated below.
1. Discretionary Advances. Construction loan agreements
often give lenders fairly wide discretion in determining whether to
make advances. For example, a lender's obligation may be made
dependent on satisfactory inspections by its architects, satisfactory
proof of the costs of labor and materials used, and satisfactory
evidence that the project is within a preestablished budget. If too
much discretion is reserved, a court may determine that the lender
in fact had no contractual obligation to make further advances,
and hence that all of its advances should lose priority to intervening liens.39 Some range of discretion is needed, for no
construction lender wants to be forced to continue making
advances if the borrower is acting in bad faith, performing sloppy
or inadequate construction, or diverting loan funds from the
project to other uses. Yet the caselaw makes it extremely difficult
to judge how much discretion the lender may retain without
jeopardizing its priority.
This dilemma is illustrated by comparing two cases with similar facts. In National Bank v. Equity Investors,' a construction
loan agreement provided that funds were
"to be advanced at such times and in such amounts as the Lender shall determine." It provided, too, that "No advance shall, be
due unless, in the judgment of the Lender" all work for which
the advance had been made had been done in a good and workmanlike manner,
and unless the construction be approved by the
41
architect.
The Washington Supreme Court concluded that this language
left so wide an area of discretion in the bank as to render the
amounts to be advanced and the intervals of their advancing
optional rather than compulsory as a matter of law. Had the
borrowers sought a decree to overcome these reservations and to

39. Perhaps the most obviously "optional" advances are those made under a construction loan agreement that fails to make any clear statement about the circumstances
under which advances will be made. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Worthley, 714
P.2d 1044, 1046-47 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985). But it is doubtful that many modem loan
agreements are this sloppily drafted.
40. 506 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1973).
41. Id. at 28.
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compel the advances, or to override the bank's discretionary
power to advance or withhold the loan funds, they would have
met with nearly insuperable obstacles at law. So broad and yet
so specific were the bank's discretionary powers under the contract as to the times and amounts of the advances, a court could
not properly override such discretion without abrogating the contract.42
Quite a different attitude is reflected in the Arkansas Supreme Court's opinion in Dempsey v. McGowan.43 The construction loan agreement in this case was similar to that in Equity
Investors; it provided that the lender would make advances "upon
authorization of the borrower and his furnishing current lien releases, and approval of the lender." 44
The court recognized that this language seemed to give the
lender considerable discretion, but it nonetheless concluded that
the advances made under the agreement were "obligatory" and
retained their priority as against intervening liens:
A literal requirement that a lender can have absolutely no discretion or any conditions relating to future advances in a mortgage
would defeat the purpose of the loan and probably bring an end
to construction money loans. From the language in the present
mortgage, it is apparent that the mortgagee was unequivocally
obligated to advance the balance of the funds for construction
purposes even though some restraints and conditions were included in the agreement.45

To reconcile these two cases takes a fine eye indeed. It is
plausible to conclude that the Arkansas court was simply more
sympathetic than its Washington counterpart to the need of construction lenders for reasonable discretion in making advances. In
all events, cases of this sort place the drafters of construction loan
agreements in a difficult posture; the line between enough discretion to protect the lender and so much discretion that priority will
be lost is exceedingly difficult to draw.
Courts' uneasiness with the optional/obligatory distinction
sometimes drives them to make statements that are nonsensical. In

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 29.
722 S.W.2d 848 (Ark. 1987).
Id. at 850.
Id.
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Southern Trust Mortgage Co. v. K & B Door Co.,46 a construction loan agreement, in a bald-faced attempt to let the lender have
its cake and eat it too, provided that "[flunds advanced in the
reasonable exercise of [the lender's] judgment that the same are
needed to complete the improvements or to protect its security are
to be deemed obligatory advances hereunder. . .,."
This is
nothing more than a statement that even optional advances are to
be considered obligatory. Amazingly, the Nevada Supreme Court
was happy to cooperate in this absurdity:
There is nothing in the loan agreement or other documents created by the parties, nor in the parties' conduct, nor in the nature
of the parties' legal relations that even remotely suggests anything but a clear duty on the part of STM to advance monies
under the agreed-upoi "obligation to do so." This conclusion is
cemented by the parties' unambiguous written agreement
that
48
"all funds" are "to be deemed obligatory advances."
The opinion does not give enough information' about the
other terms of the agreement to permit us to form a judgment
about whether the advances in question were actually optional.
But it is clear that the "to be deemed obligatory" clause does not
"cement" anything. A pig does not become a cow merely because
parties "deem" it to be a cow. In effect, the court permitted the
lender to rewrite the law of future advances in complete disregard
of the fundamental purpose of the optional/obligatory advance
doctrine. Drafters in other jurisdictions might be tempted to employ the same technique, but they have no assurance that other
courts will be similarly receptive.
2. The Lender's Failure to Use Its Protective Conditions. Construction loan agreements frequently contain conditions designed to protect the lender that are not at all vague or
discretionary. Rather, they spell out objective facts that condition
the lender's obligation to make advances. 49 For example, in J..
46. 763 P.2d 353 (Nev. 1988).
47. Id. at 354.

48. Id. at 354-55.
49. See, e.g., Briarwood Towers 85th Co. v. Guterman, 523 N.Y.S.2d 98, 101 (App.
Div. 1988); Schalmo Builders, Inc. v. Malz, 629 N.E.2d 52, 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(failing to make clear whether the conditions in the case were actually satisfied); see also
Conshohocken Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Period & Country Homes, Inc., 430 A.2d 1173,
1179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (finding that a schedule of progress payments submitted by
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Kislak Mortgage Corp. v. William Matthews Builder, Inc.,50 a
construction loan agreement provided as follows:
None of the said respective installments or any part thereof, not
theretofore paid over shall be required to be made by Lender
unless and until Borrower shall procure and deliver to Lender
original receipts or such other evidence as shall be satisfactory to
Lender, showing that any installment received theretofore under
this Agreement has been disbursed fully and properly to materialmen, laborers, subcontractors, and to any other person, firm or
corporation providing or furnishing materials or labor or both, in
connection with the construction of said improvements on the
above mentioned premises."
A clause of this sort is quite objective and perfectly reasonable as
a means of assuring the lender that the borrower is not diverting
construction funds while leaving bills unpaid. The existence of such
conditions does not undermine the obligatory nature of the advances, provided, of course, that
the conditions are met when the
52
advances in question are made
The lender in Kislak, however, did not enforce the condition;
it made advances without first demanding to see receipts showing
that the bills had been paid. 3 This may have been a reasonable
decision by the officer administering the construction loan. Perhaps
the borrower had a track record of reliability and trustworthiness
such that it seemed unnecessary to demand the receipts. But the
lender's decision to forgo this protection turned out to be fatal, for
the court held that since there was no obligation to make advances without submission of the receipts, all of the advances were
optional and hence lost their priority when construction liens were
filed. 4 The point is clear: the lender must actually use the protective conditions it has given itself in the construction loan agreement. If it waives or disregards them, it risks loss of priority.

the developer to the construction lender was merely an estimate, and that compliance
with the schedule was not a condition to the making of advances).
50. 287 A.2d 686 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972), affd, 303 A,2d 648 (Del. 1973).
51. Id. at 688-89.
52. See, e.g., Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co. v. Southard, 384 N.E.2d 250, 253 n.2 (Ohio
1978) ("The fact that the agreement contained conditions precedent to payments of a
given advance does not affect the obligatory nature of those advances."); see also cases
cited supra note 49.
53. Kislak, 287 A.2d at 689.
54. Id.
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3. Advances Made After Default. Virtually without exception, construction loan agreements give the lender the power to
discontinue the making of advances (and ultimately to foreclose
the mortgage) if the borrower defaults. There are many possible
forms of default. The borrower might, for example, build structures that fail to comply with the plans and specifications
incorporated into the agreement. The borrower might fail to make
a required payment of interest. The project might fall behind
schedule, so that it cannot be completed within the term of the
loan. The construction loan agreement may make the filing of
mechanic's liens against the project a condition of default.'
But the sort of default that is most likely to occur is an "out
of balance" construction loan account. When a construction loan is
made, the entire loan amount is usually transferred by the lender
to a construction loan account, earmarked for the project in question, and held by the lender. This is only a paper transfer; the
lender still has control of the funds.56 The loan agreement typically provides that before each advance is made, the funds remaining
in the account must be sufficient to complete the project. Often
the inspecting architect must certify this fact prior to the making
of each advance. If this certification cannot be made, the loan is
said to be out of balance. This means that factors such as price
increases in labor or materials, construction delays, defaults by
subcontractors, or unexpected conditions on the site have made it
impossible to complete the project with the remaining funds. In
the most extreme form of this sort of default, the construction

55. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Worthley, 714 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Okla. Ct. App.
1985) ("The question that must be answered is whether the bank was in fact obliged to
advance the full $325,000.00 despite receiving reports that supplies and mechanics were
not being paid.").
56. Pennsylvania courts, in a remarkable exercise of judicial legerdemain, have held
that a lender's transfer of loan funds into the construction loan account somehow makes
all advances obligatory, even if some of those advances are subject to conditions and the
conditions are not met. Central Pa. Say. Ass'n v. Carpenters of Pa., 444 A.2d 755 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982), affd, 463 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1983). No other jurisdiction seems to have
followed this peculiar theory.
57. See GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 1030-34 (i993); NELSON &
WHrTMAN, supra note 1, § 12.1; Colin C. Livingston, Current Business Approaches-Commercial Construction Lending, ABA SECTION ON REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE
AND TRuST LAW, REAL ESTATE FINANCING-TODAY & TOMORROW 54 (1978); Noel W.

Nellis, A Construction Loan Agreement, PRAc. REAL EST. L., July 1985, at 65, 68.
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loan account has been exhausted but the project is not yet complete.
What is a construction lender to do in such a case? One
course of action is to cease making advances, foreclose the construction mortgage, take over the project,58 complete it, and place
it on the market." While this course is open to the lender, it is
usually unattractive. The -lender is usually a financial institution
with little expertise in hands-on real estate development. Construction is a risky business at best,' and if the lender steps into the
developer's shoes, it inherits a partially completed project with
little detailed knowledge of the problems the developer has encountered thus far. Few lenders wish to place themselves in such a
position except as a last resort. It is usually much more sensible to
allow the borrower to continue construction, waive the default,
continue to fund the loan, and if necessary, even increase the
amount of the loan somewhat in order to get the project finished.
The difficulty with the latter course of action, however, is that
since the lender has no duty to allow the borrower to continue, all
of the further advances become optional. One writer has argued
that although advances made in this context are admittedly optional in a legal sense, they are obligatory in a business sense, for
continuing to fund the loan is the only rational decision the lender
can make." However, there is no case authority for the proposition that this sort of "obligation" serves to preserve the construction lender's priority.
4. What Constitutes Notice? The optional/obligatory advance
doctrine causes a loss in priority only to intervening liens of which
the future advances lender has notice at the time of the advance.
In a minority of states, constructive notice is the test. Since the
intervening lien is usually recorded, in these states the prior

58. This assumes that no third-party bidder will outbid the construction lender at the
foreclosure sale. This assumption is usually realistic, for partially completed projects are
notoriously unattractive investments to foreclosure bidders. The construction lender nearly
always ends up taking title.
59. Conceivably the project can be sold by the lender in its partially completed form,
but such a sale is likely only at a very large loss, since few buyers are apt to be interested in assuming the risks of completing somebody else's botched project.
60. See, e.g., Henry S. Kesler, Construction Lending Risks and Returns, MORTGAGE
BANKING, Jan. 1989, at 62; Henry S. Kesler, Construction Loans: Lenders Beware, MORTGAGE BANKING, July 1987, at 38.
61. Skipworth, supra note 1, at 221.
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mortgagee may safely make optional advances only if it obtains a
title examination before each advance. 62 Under the majority
approach, only actual knowledge counts against the prior
mortgagee,' and therefore regular title examinations during the
administration of the construction loan are presumably unnecessary.
However, it is by no means obvious what constitutes actual
knowledge in the common situation in which the intervening lien
is a mechanic's or materialman's lien. There is authority that the
future advances lender loses priority when making an optional
advance if visible work has been done by the lienor, 4 if the lender knows that suppliers or subcontractors have not been paid on
time,' or if it knows that there are unpaid claims and that "the
[mortgagor] is unable to pay such claims or that the claimant

62. Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Platt Homes, Inc., 449 A.2d 553, 555-58 (NJ.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982); Briarwood Towers 85th Co. v. Guterman, 523 N.Y.S.2d 98,
100-01 (App. Div. 1988) (requiring "actual or constructive notice"); Tyler v. Butcher, 734
P.2d 1382, 1385-86 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); People's Say. Bank v. Champlin Lumber Co.,
258 A.2d 82 (R.I. 1969).
63. See Mobley v. Brundidge Banking Co., 347 So. 2d 1347, 1349-50 (Ala. 1977);
Union Nat'l Bank v. First State Bank & Trust, 697 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Ark. Ct. App.
1985); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 596 P.2d 429, 433-34 (Idaho 1979); Axel Newman
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Sauers, 47 N.W.2d 769, 772 (Minn. 1951); North v. J.W.
McClintock, Inc., 44 So. 2d 412, 414 (Miss. 1950); Housing Mortgage Corp. v. Allied
Constr., Inc., 97 A.2d 802, 805-06 (Pa. 1953); Central Pa. Say. Ass'n v. 'Carpenters of
Pa., 444 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982), aff'd, 463 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1983); Lake v.
Shumate, 20 S.C. 23, 25 (1882) (reversed in 1934 by former S.C. CODE ANN. § 8712-2
(Law. Co-op. 1942) (recodified at S.C. CODE ANN. §29-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (giving
full priority to all future advances irrespective of notice)), applied in McMillen Feed
Mills, Inc. v. Mayer, 220 S.E.2d 221, 225-27 (S.C. 1975); Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559
P.2d 538, 540-41 (Utah 1977); Colonial Bank v. Marine Bank, N.A., 448 N.W.2d 659, 661
(Wis. 1989); First Interstate Bank v. Heritage Bank & Trust, 480 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1992).
Several states have enacted statutes requiring written notice to the future advances
lender in order to deprive it of its priority. These statutes effectively eliminate the confusion discussed in the text. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 505(5)(B) (West Supp.
1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238.01(1)(b) (1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.232(B)
(Baldwin Supp. 1993), construed in Schalmo Builders, Inc. v. Malz, 629 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-25-10(b) (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1207
(1984); W. VA. CODE § 38-1-14(e) (Supp. 1994). See also the following repealed statutes,
which provide additional drafting illustrations. ALAsKA STAT. § 06.30.560(2) (1988), repealed by 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 26, § 102; N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-05.1 (1987),
repealed by 1991 N.D. Laws ch. 84, § 1.
64. R.B. Thompson, Jr. Lumber Co. v. Windsor Dev. Corp., 374 N.W.2d 493, 497
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
65. First Nat'l Bank v. Worthley, 714 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985).
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intends to 'file a lien.' , 66 In many states there is no clear decision as to what sort of information about potential mechanic's
liens results in the denial of the construction lender's priority.
In this ocean of ambiguity a construction lender can find no
island of refuge. Both aspects of the common law optional/obligatory distinction are unclear: what makes an advance optional, and what sort of notice of intervening -mechanic's liens
destroys the priority of such an advance? Careful drafting of construction loan agreements may clarify the first aspect a bit, but the
law is fundamentally flawed and frustrates reasonable business
planning.
C. Line of Credit Loans and Optional Advances
While lenders have long disliked the optional/obligatory test in
the context of construction loans, the 1980s witnessed great growth
of a new type of loan with which the test was equally incompatible: the "home equity" loan, typically a second mortgage to secure
a fluctuating line of credit on the borrower's residence. 67 Credit
line mortgages have been used for decades in business lending, but
their widespread use in loans to consumers is much more recent.
Some of these arrangements contemplate advances over which the
lender has sufficient discretion that the advances might well be
regarded as optional. Of course, the lenders have no wish to suffer
the inefficiency and delay that would result if it were necessary for
them to examine the record title before every disbursement.
Credit line mortgages often contain conditions; if the borrower
fails to meet these conditions, the lender may discontinue advances. Such conditions may include, for example, a default under a
senior mortgage, 6 a material deterioration in the borrower's financial condition, an unacceptable reduction in the value of the
real estate, 9 and failure to maintain the improvements on the
real estate in a manner acceptable to the lender." Like the con-

66. Grider v. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 565 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978).
67. See Forrester, supra note 3.
68. A provision of this sort is known as a cross-default clause. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. 1981).
69. See, e.g., Russell Corp. v. BancBoston Fin. Co., 434 S.E.2d 716, 717 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1993) (conditioning continuation of advances on appraisal of real estate).
70. The home equity deed of trust in effect on the home of one of the authors
provides that the trustor agrees
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struction loan clauses discussed above, these conditions may raise
optional advance issues in two distinct ways: they may be considered so subjective as to make all advances inherently discretionary,
and even if the standards they set are clear, lenders will often
continue making advances even when those standards are not met.
Additionally, virtually all line of credit loans impose ceilings on
the total outstanding balance, and a lender who voluntarily permits
draws in excess of such a ceiling, even for good business reasons,
will doubtless be held to have made an optional advance." As
far as we can tell, there are yet no reported cases raising these
issues, but their advent is simply a matter of time.
IV. STATUTORY ATrEMPTs TO SOLVE THE
FUTURE ADVANCES PROBLEM

From the viewpoint of mortgagees, the optional/obligatory
advance doctrine is a serious and costly problem. Not surprisingly,
lenders have lobbied energetically and fairly effectively for statutory change in a number of jurisdictions. Many changes occurred
during the 1980s. One form of change, adopted by several states,
is found in the Uniform Land Security Interest Act (ULSIA),
promulgated in 1985 by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. Its intent is to eliminate the mortgagor's
default as a basis for deeming advances "optional." To accomplish
this, the Act redefines "obligatory" to mean to be "pursuant to
commitment, ... whether or not a default ... has relieved or

[t]o properly care for and keep the Property in good condition and repair;
Not to remove, demolish or materially alter any building or any improvement
on the Property; nor to change or alter (i) the terms and/or conditions of any
existing lease with respect to all or part of the Property; nor (ii) the present
character or use of the Property;
To complete or restore promptly, and in good and workmanlike fashion, any
building or improvement which may be in process, constructed, damaged or
destroyed on the Property and to pay in full all costs and expenses incurred in
connection with such completion or restoration;
To comply with all laws, ordinances, regulations, covenants, conditions or restrictions affecting the Property ....
First Interstate Bank of Utah, Advanceline Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents
(Dec. 1989). It is easy to imagine violations of these covenants that would in theory
permit the lender to discontinue further advances, but that in fact the lender would consider trivial and would disregard. Any advance made thereafter would technically be
optional.
71. See Russell Corp., 434 S.E.2d at 718 ("[T]he bank did not have an unconditional
obligation to fund overadvances up to $4,000,000, once it had received the appraisals.").

HeinOnline -- 44 Duke L.J. 683 1994-95

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:657

may relieve [the mortgagee] from its obligation."72 ULSIA further
states that an advance is considered "pursuant to commitment...
whether or not ... [an] event not within [the mortgagee's] control
'
has relieved or may relieve it from its obligation."73
This language solves most of the problems of construction
lenders and line of credit lenders discussed above. It ensures that
advances will have priority even if the borrower has failed to meet
the conditions imposed by the loan agreement or has defaulted
and is therefore no longer entitled to any advances. It may also
(although the point is debatable) preserve the lender's priority
when the lender fails to enforce or utilize the protections it has reserved in the loan agreement.74 The only problem of construction
lenders discussed above that ULSIA does not adequately address
is the situation in which the mortgagee has reserved too much
discretion, or has too much control of the relevant conditions, so
that its75 advance cannot be regarded as "pursuant to commitment.
But while ULSIA provides great comfort to future advances
lenders, it does so at a high cost, for it loses sight of the original
purpose of the optional/obligatory doctrine: to protect the mortgagor's right to use his unencumbered equity in the real estate as
security for additional borrowing. Assume, under a statute contain-

72. UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACr § 111(19) (1985). The language was drawn
from U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(k) (1990). State statutes following it with respect to future advance mortgages include ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/15-1302 (Smith-Hurd 1992);
LI. GEN. LAWS § 34-25-10(b) (1984).
73. The quoted phrases are drawn from U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(k). Article 9 of the
U.C.C. implements a system for determining future advance priorities similar to that of
ULSIA, with certain modifications to accommodate the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.). See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(4), -307(3), -312(7) (1990).
74. Whether the quoted language will have that effect depends on the meaning of
the phrase an "event not within [the mortgagee's] control." UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT § 111(19) (1985). Consider the facts of J.I. Kislak Mortgage Corp. v. William Matthews Builder, Inc., 287 A.2d 686, 687 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972), afftd, 303 A.2d
648 (Del. 1973). In that case, the construction lender failed to insist that the borrower
submit paid invoices of suppliers and subcontractors before honoring each draw, as the
loan agreement provided. The lender was therefore technically not required 'to make the
advances, but did so anyway. Was the "event" that excused the lender's duty to make
advances the borrower's failure to submit the invoices (arguably an event "not within
[the mortgagee's] control," as ULSIA puts it) or the lender's failure to demand the invoices (obviously an event "within the lender's control")? ULSIA can be read either way
on this point.
75. See National Bank v. Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20, 29 (Wash. 1973).
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ing the features described above, that Mortgagee-1 makes a line
of credit mortgage loan to Mortgagor for business purposes. Mortgagee-1 promises to fund the loan up to a maximum of $100,000,
but only on certain conditions, one of which is that Mortgagor
maintain a specific credit rating. After Mortgagor borrows $50,000
under this loan, Mortgagor's credit rating falls below the specified
level and Mortgagee-1 refuses to make further advances. The
value of the real estate is still well above $100,000, so Mortgagor
approaches Mortgagee-2 and attempts to arrange a junior mortgage loan. Mortgagee-2 is willing and is plainly able to give Mortgagee-1 actual notice that a second loan is about to be made.
However, Mortgagee-2 realizes that Mortgagee-1 might in the
future relax its position and make further advances to Mortgagor.
If Mortgagee-1 did so, those advances would quite plainly be
"pursuant to commitment" as defined in ULSIA, despite the fact
that because the credit condition would be unsatisfied, Mortgagee-1 could not be compelled to make them. Hence, these advances
would have priority over Mortgagee-2's lien. Since Mortgagee-2
cannot be sure that such advances will not be made by Mortgagee-i, Mortgagee-2 will consider the real estate inadequate security
and will refuse to make the second mortgage loan. Thus Mortgagor is in precisely the awkward and inefficient position that the
optional/obligatory doctrine was designed to avoid: she has substantial unencumbered equity in the realty but cannot get a loan
from any source on its security.
Viewed in this light, ULSIA is puzzling. It provides protection
for lenders, but at the expense of borrowers, who are left unable
to borrow against their equity. The baby is thrown out with the
bathwater. It would have been simpler, and no less harmful to
borrowers, for ULSIA to repeal the optional/obligatory advance
distinction altogether and give priority to all future advances. Indeed, a number of recent state statutes do precisely this, at least
in some situations, rather than following ULSIA.76

76. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 506-1(b) (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2336 (1983);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 289.441(4) (Baldwin 1987); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP.
§ 7-102(b) (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479:3 (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 46:9-8.2
(West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-9 (Michie 1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 281(2) (McKinney 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-50(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 44-8-26 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 60.04.226
(West Supp. 1995).
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Quite a different approach to the future advances problem is
represented by recent statutes in a number of jurisdictions redefining "notice" to make it clear that only actual written notice delivered to the mortgagee will place its priority at risk. These statutes place the onus on the prospective intervening lienor to take
affirmative steps to ensure that the senior mortgagee is aware of
its position. This is a marginally worthwhile but essentially trivial
modification of the traditional optional/obligatory advance doctrine.
It eliminates the uncertainty about what sort of notice will result
in loss of priority of an advance, but it does nothing to resolve the
fundamental problem discussed above. It is doubtful that these
statutes facilitate the making of any junior mortgage loans that
would not be made otherwise, since even a junior lender that gives
actual written notice to the senior mortgagee will still be subordinate to the senior's advances if they are considered obligatory.
A. The Statutory Cutoff Notice
About a dozen recent statutes attempt to deal with the problem of unavailability of junior financing to the borrower in a much
more ingenious and effective way. Under these statutes, all future
advances, whether obligatory or optional, take the priority of the
original mortgage and are senior to any intervening liens. However, in order to help the borrower obtain junior mortgage loans, the
statutes adopt the concept of a "cutoff notice": a notice issued by
the borrower to the future advances lender that freezes advances
at their current level.78 The notice, in effect, empowers borrowers
77. See statutes cited supra note 63. Most of these statutes permit the delivery of notice by a junior lienor to act as a subordination only of optional advances, thus following
the common law approach, but several of them appear to subordinate all advances to an
intervening lienor who gives notice. See ALASKA STAT. § 06.30.560(2) (1988), repealed by
1993 Alaska Sess. Law ch. 26, § 102; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 505(5)(B) (West
Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1207 (1984). In effect, the latter statutes are operationally similar to the cutoff notice statutes discussed infra text accompanying note 78,
except that the notice is given by the junior lienor rather than the mortgagor.
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04(1)(b) (West Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 505(5)(A); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.055(6) (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 71-1-206(3) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238.01(1)(a) (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 106.380(1) (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-72 (1991); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5301.232(C) (Baldwin 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.155(3) (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
34-25-11 (Michie 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-28-105 to -110 (1988); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-58.2 (Michie Supp. 1994). The earliest of these statutes was Montana's. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-206(3) note (1993). For an additional drafting illustration, see
ALASKA STAT. § 06.30.560 (1988), repealed by 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 26, § 102.
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to write future advances clauses out of mortgages, but only prospectively. A borrower who has this power to freeze advances has
no need of the optional/obligatory distinction. If the borrower
needs additional financing, cannot get it on satisfactory terms from
the existing mortgagee, and wishes to pursue borrowing opportunities with other lenders, she need merely issue a cutoff notice. The
mortgagee is thus informed that no further advances will be secured by the mortgage; the future advance provisions of the loan
are terminated. Other lenders may then safely take junior mortgages on the property, knowing that no further advances on the
79
senior debt will occur to exhaust the borrower's equity.
The cutoff notice is a brilliantly simple solution to the dilemma of the borrower who has signed a mortgage with a future
advances clause and who now needs additional financing. While
technically it is the borrower who must issue the cutoff notice, it
will ordinarily be the prospective junior lender that requires the
borrower to issue it, for no knowledgeable junior lender will make
a loan without it. With a cutoff procedure in effect, there is no
need for the law to subordinate optional advances, for once a
cutoff notice is given, there will not be any further advances by
the senior lender, optional or otherwise. Hence, the cutoff notice
statutes simply repeal the optional/obligatory advance doctrine and

The Maine statute was amended in 1993 to apply, effective January 1, 1994, to
mortgages taken by all types of lenders; the previous version, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
9-B, § 436 (West 1980 Supp. 1994), applied only to mortgage loans made by financial
institutions. The previous version remains in effect with respect to mortgages recorded
before January 1, 1994.
The Missouri statute applies only if the security interest "contain[s] a provision expressly stating that the instrument is to be governed by this section." Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 443.055(1)(10); see Bank of Urbana v. Wright, 880 S.W.2d 921 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
(applying this language and determining that previous common law principles governed a
future advance mortgage that did not contain such an election). The Rhode Island statute
likewise applies only if the title of the mortgage includes a direct reference to the code
section. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-25-13.
Four of the statutes (those in Alaska, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Virginia)
permit a cutoff notice to operate only against optional advances. This limitation seriously
restricts these statutes' usefulness, since the application of the optional/obligatory distinction remains uncertain.
79. Under these statutes the junior lien is still subject to accrual of interest on the
senior loan, to the senior's costs of enforcement and foreclosure, and to any advances the
senior lender might make to protect the security. But these are risks that every junior
lienholder must assume, whether the prior mortgage generally secures future advances or
not. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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provide that all advances made before the lender's receipt of a
cutoff notice have the priority of the original mortgage.80
A junior lender will doubtless prefer the protection of the
cutoff notice to that given by the traditional optional/obligatory
advance doctrine. The effect of the cutoff notice is clear and absolute; the junior lender knows that the balance on the senior lien
cannot be enlarged by any further advances. By contrast, under
the traditional doctrine, the junior lender must worry about the
vagaries of the courts' views as to which advances are deemed
optional and which ones obligatory-a nasty thicket indeed.
Many of the cutoff notice statutes provide for the recording of
some form of certificate executed by the senior lender, showing
that it has received the cutoff notice." This is a highly convenient
feature from the viewpoint of a borrower who has decided to seek
a junior loan but has not yet identified the lender that will make
it. With the certificate on record, the borrower can approach various lenders and immediately establish that the future advances
clause in the original senior mortgage presents no risk to them.
There is a minor variation in the effect of the statutory cutoff
notice provisions. Some of them render unsecured any advances
made after receipt of the notice; the mortgage's future advances
clause is made entirely ineffective as to such advances." Others,
however, merely subordinate the priority of further advances to
intervening liens.' There seems to be no sound reason to restrict
the borrower to one of these results rather than the other; either
will have the desired effect of making junior financing readily

80.

See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.055(5):

As to any third party who may acquire or claim any rights in or a lien
upon the encumbered real property, the priority of the lien of a security instrument securing future advances or future obligations shall date from the time the
security instrument is recorded, whether or not any third party has actual notice
of any such advances or obligations and whether or not such advances or obligations are optional or obligatory with the lender.
81. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.055(6) (1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 106.380(2)
(Michie. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-72(a) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.155(4) (1988);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-25-11 (1984).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04(1)(b) (West Supp. 1995); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 443.055(6)(1); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106A00 (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
45-72(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.232(C) (Baldwin 1993); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 86.155(3); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-25-11.
83. ALASKA STAT. § 06.30.560(2) (1988), repealed by 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 26,
§ 102; MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-206(3) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238.01(1)(b)
(1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-28-108(b) (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-58.2(7) (Michie
Supp. 1994).
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available. However, if the future advances lender had a duty to
make further advances upon the borrower's request, it should
certainly be excused from that duty by a cutoff notice that subordinates the further advances;' otherwise, a lender that expected
to have first priority for its advances would have only third (or
worse) priority instead, surely an unconscionable result.
B. Cases in Which a Cutoff Is Impermissible
As some of the statutes recognize, there are certain situations
in which a borrower should not be permitted to issue a cutoff notice because doing so could unfairly harm the future advances
lender's legitimate interests. Two distinct forms of unfairness to
the lender are conceivable: impairment of the value of the real
estate as security, and impairment of the lender's ability to perform obligations it has undertaken to third parties. Each of these
issues requires some discussion.
In some cases, if the lender cannot make any further advances, it may not get the real estate value for which it bargained as
collateral. The best illustration is a construction loan. Obviously a
half-finished building may not be worth half as much as a finished
building. A lender that forecloses on a partially completed project
may have to spend far more money than remains in the construction loan account to complete and market it. In such a case the
lender usually has to employ a general contractor to complete the
work that another party started, using that party's plans and specifications and often hiring the same subcontractors. The cost of
completion will have these added and somewhat unusual risks built
into it.
Hence a lender that has made a construction loan and receives a valid cutoff notice from the borrower partway through the
construction process (perhaps because the borrower has found a
lower-interest source of funds with which to complete the project)
can be placed in a very awkward position. If the project is never
actually completed (a fact now beyond the original construction
lender's control), the lender's security may be seriously inadequate
to cover the outstanding debt. Several of the cutoff notice statutes,
recognizing this problem, exempt construction loans from the cutoff notice procedure.' This is a sound idea, for construction loan
84. Oddly, none of the cutoff notice statutes seem to deal with this issue.
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04(b) (West Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN.
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borrowers have little legitimate need for cutoff notices. The purpose of the notice, after all, is to permit borrowers to use their
equity to obtain junior financing. Construction loan borrowers,
however, typically have little or no equity until construction is
complete; because of the risks outlined above, during most of the
construction process their loans are often "under water" or nearly
so. And while construction loan borrowers might occasionally
appreciate the opportunity to "reshop" their loans for lower interest rates partway through the construction, there is certainly no
important public policy to be served by giving them cutoff notice
rights to help them do so. 6
The second context in which a cutoff notice may operate
unfairly against a lender arises when the lender has duties to third
parties and the mortgage secures the borrower's obligation to
reimburse the lender's performance of those duties. Suppose, for
example, the borrower is a real estate developer who wishes to
obtain a ground lease of certain land. The developer's credit, however, is not strong enough to satisfy the prospective ground lessor.
The lender therefore convinces a bank to issue an irrevocable
standby letter of credit to the lessor, in effect guaranteeing the
developer's performance under the lease.87 The bank, in turn,
requires the developer to execute a reimbursement agreement
promising to repay any sums that the bank is compelled to pay
out under the letter of credit. Finally, the bank demands that the
developer provide collateral to secure the reimbursement agreement, and the developer gives the bank a mortgage on certain
other land for this purpose.
Initially the bank has paid nothing, and there is no obligation
on the developer to reimburse any particular sum. If the developer
subsequently defaults on the ground lease and the lessor demands
payment by the bank under the letter of credit, an obligation will
arise on the developer to reimburse that sum. In substance, the
draw on the letter of credit is a future advance. Suppose, however,

§ 443.055(9)(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.232(C) (Baldwin
1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-28-109(3) (1988).
86. Even if no cutoff notice is available to construction loan borrowers, they still
have the opportunity to refinance the entire loan partway through construction. Such
refinancings are probably quite rare.
87. We say "in effect" because technically a letter of credit is not a guaranty, but
rather a direct and primary obligation of the issuing bank. See 1 JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 19-1, at 4 (3d ed. 1988).
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that the developer, knowing that a default on the ground lease is
imminent, has the power to issue a cutoff notice to the bank.
Since the letter of credit is irrevocable, the bank must pay under
it, but the cutoff notice will deprive the bank of the collateral it
reserved to secure the reimbursement to which it is entitled.
Under these circumstances, it is intolerable to permit the
issuance of a cutoff notice. The bank cannot escape its duty to
"advance" the funds, and therefore it cannot in good conscience
be denied its security for their repayment. Several of the cutoff
notice statutes recognize this imperative.'
C. The Cutoff Notice as a Breach by the Borrower
The duties of borrowers and lenders with respect to future
advances depend on the nature of the loan commitment or agreement and can conveniently be arranged into three categories. In
the first and simplest, the traditional "optional" advance, neither
party has a duty to lend or borrow; the lender merely says, "If
you later request a further advance, and if we decide to make that
advance to you, its repayment will be secured by the original
mortgage." In the second and third categories, the commitment or
agreement may be either unilateral or bilateral. 9 If it is unilateral, the lender says, in substance, "We promise to honor your request for a further advance, if any, and the original mortgage will
secure its repayment." A bilateral loan agreement, on the other

88. The Missouri statute, in which this problem is more fully developed than in any
of the other statutes, provides that
the notice of termination shall be ineffective:
(a) To the extent of the liability of the lender obligated under an irrevocable
letter of credit and to the extent the security instrument secures the repayment
of obligations to the lender arising therefrom; or
(b) To the extent of the liability of the guarantor to a person guaranteed and
to the extent the guarantee is secured by the security instrument, and was given
in a business or agricultural loan transaction; or
(c) To the extent that a security instrument secures the liability of a third party
in a business or agricultural loan transaction ....
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 433.055(9)(1)(a)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
89. It is a sad fact of business life that both lenders and borrowers are unduly casual in clarifying whether they intend loan agreements to be unilateral or bilateral, and that
the resulting vagueness sometimes gives rise to disagreement and litigation. See, e.g.,
Lowe v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 127 Cal. Rptr. 23, 26-27 (Ct. App. 1976); Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burleigh House, Inc., 305 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974), cert. dismissed, 336 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042
(1977).
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hand, also imposes a duty on the borrower to draw down the
funds; the lender says, "We promise to lend, and you promise to
borrow, the advance in question, and the original mortgage will
secure its repayment."'9
It is this third sort of agreement on which we now wish to
focus. Suppose the borrower has a contractual duty to borrow the
funds, but nonetheless issues a cutoff notice that amounts, in effect, to an anticipatory breach of that obligation. Should the cutoff
notice be effective? None of the statutes seem to address this
issue, but the simple and obvious answer is that the right to issue
a cutoff notice is nonwaivable. Damages are the lender's only
remedy; the courts have consistently refused to award specific
performance of loan commitments to lenders. 1 Thus, the borrower who issues a notice under these circumstances can refuse to
borrow additional funds, but may be liable in damages for the
breach of contract. A borrower may be ill-advised to take such a
step, but the notice will work.
From an economic viewpoint, this result is entirely warranted
by the concept of the "efficient breach." In the present context, it
is entirely possible that the borrower can find other financing with
interest cost low enough that the borrower's savings will more
than cover the original lender's damages in full. If this is the case,
economic efficiency is served, since the borrower is plainly better
off and the original lender no worse off as a result of the breach.
The law should facilitate such breaches, and permitting the issuance of a cutoff notice does precisely that.'
V. THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF
A CUTOFF NOTICE SYSTEM

On the whole, the cutoff notice statutes provide an intelligent
and highly functional solution to the problem of priority of future

90. See NELSON & WHrTMAN, supra note 1, § 12.3 nn. 25-27.
91. See, e.g., City Centre One Assocs. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am., 656
F. Supp. 658 (D. Utah 1987); Roger D. Groot, Specific Performance of Contracts to Provide Permanent Financing, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 718, 727-36 (1975).
92.

See WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS

142 (2d ed. 1988); James P. Fenton, Note, Liquidated Damages as Prima Facie Evidence,
51 IND. LJ. 189, 190-92 (1975) ("Where contracts have become unproductive, breach of
contract should be encouraged by awarding only compensation, because compensation
properly reallocates resources.").
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advances. However, only twelve states have such statutes.93 In
many other jurisdictions, the problems of the common law optional/obligatory advance doctrine discussed earlier in this Article continue to plague lenders and borrowers alike. Thus the question
arises: is it appropriate for a court to adopt the cutoff notice concept as a matter of court-made law, with no statute to support the
decision? At first blush this may seem a radical idea, but we believe it is a step greatly to be encouraged and entirely within the
scope of judicial authority in all states except those in which a
specific statute stands in the way.94
As reporters for the Restatement (Second) of Property-Security (Mortgages), we have drafted, and the American Law Institute
has tentatively approved, a Restatement section that would implement this step.95 We offer here a brief for such judicial action.
A. A Historical Rationale
We begin with the obvious premise that the traditional optional/obligatory advance doctrine is itself court-made law. In Hopkinson v. Rolt,96 the 1861 English case in which the doctrine may
have originated,' the House of Lords made no reference to any
statute in support of its decision, for no relevant statute existed.
Since the doctrine was created by a court, can a court not replace
93. See statutes cited supra note 78.
94. In a few states, the common law optional/obligatory doctrine is enshrined in statute, at least in limited situations, and could not be overthrown without legislative amendment. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238.01 (1994) (providing that optional advances
lose priority to intervening lien or encumbrance, including valid mechanic's lien, if intervening lienor gives mortgagee written notice); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.232(B)
(Baldwin Supp. 1993) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-28-103(c) (Supp. 1994) (providing
that optional advances lose priority if mortgagee has "actual notice" of intervening lien);
W. VA. CODE § 38-1-14(e) (Supp. 1994) (providing that optional advances lose priority
if intervening lienor gives mortgagee written notice). For additional illustrative statutory
language, see N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-05.1 (1987), repealed by 1991 N.D. Laws ch. 84,
§ 1.
95.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 2.3 (Ten-

tative Draft No. 1, 1991).
96. 11 Eng. Rep. 829 (1861).
97. Whether Hopkinson marked the inception of the doctrine is uncertain. The opinion in that case contains an extensive debate among the judges about the significance of
Gordon v. Graham, 22 Eng. Rep. 502 (1716), which appears to have awarded priority for
future advances to a first mortgagee on the ground that the second mortgagee had actual
notice of the existence of the future advances clause in the first mortgage. The report of
the Gordon case is brief, the facts are not fully developed, and it is difficult to determine the precise holding. For our purposes the debate is unimportant.
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it with a more functional doctrine? We think the answer is affirmative.
Indeed, the concurring opinion of Lord Cranworth in Hopkinson v. Rolt comes very close to foreshadowing just this development:
[S]uppose that the second mortgage should be made on the express contract of the mortgagor, communicated to the first
mortgagee, that he would not thenceforth borrow any more money from the first mortgagee. In such a case the rule giving precedence to the first mortgagee for future advances could not be
acted on ....

And whenever the dealings of the parties have

been such as to satisfy the Court that they intended to postpone
the future advances of the first mortgagee to those under the
second mortgage, effect will be given to that intention.98
The sort of contract Lord Cranworth described comes remarkably
close to being a cutoff notice. Cranworth's comment (which seems
to have been given as an aside, and hardly as a main point of his
opinion) is subject to some criticism. He appears to have assumed
that the mortgagor's promise not to borrow additional funds on
the first mortgage will bind the first mortgagee if communicated to
it, but that is by no means obvious under ordinary principles of
contract law. Suppose B promises C that B will engage in no
further transactions with A, and A has knowledge of the promise.
Nevertheless, B later approaches A and proposes a further transaction. A may know that doing so will result in a breach of B's
contract with C, or A may assume that the B-C contract is now
terminated or that C has waived any objection to the new A-B
transaction. Whatever A thinks, assume that A indeed consummates the new transaction with B. It hardly seems open to doubt
that the new A-B transaction is legally valid and enforceable. A
might worry about being charged with the tort of intentional interference with the B-C contract, but even if the tort were proved it
would have no effect on the enforceability of the A-B transaction.
Cranworth's last sentence quoted above is not quite to the
point. He wrote that if the "parties" intend to subordinate additional advances under the first mortgage to a second mortgage, the
courts will give effect to that intent. That is doubtless true; the
intent would comprise a subordination agreement. But this prin-

98. Hopkinson, 11 Eng. Rep. at 841-42.
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ciple does not fit the postulated facts. The mortgagor and the
second mortgagee may provide copious evidence that they intend
that any subsequent advances on the first mortgage should be
subordinated, but this is a far cry from evidence that the first
mortgagee intends to subordinate. Absent such concurrence by the
first mortgagee, further advances under the first mortgagee will
retain their priority no matter what the intent of the mortgagor
and the second mortgagee might be. An argument could be made
that if the mortgagor and the second mortgagee enter into an
agreement by which the mortgagor covenants to refrain from taking any more advances, and if these parties then notify the first
mortgagee of their agreement, the first mortgagee may be estopped from making any such advances and claiming priority for
them. Such a notice would inform the first mortgagee of the reliance the second mortgagee was placing on the absence of any
further advances. But whether a court would find estoppel on
these facts is uncertain.
These are not technical quibbles. No intelligent second mortgagee will make a loan to the mortgagor unless it can be absolutely sure that the balance on the first mortgage will not be inflated
by additional advances. Lord Cranworth's hypothetical facts, as
they stand, do not satisfy this condition. It is easy to modify them
so that they do, however. Imagine that Cranworth had added the
following bracketed words to his first sentence quoted above:
"[S]uppose that the second mortgage should be made on the express contract of the mortgagor, communicated to [and agreed to
by] the first mortgagee, that he would not thenceforth borrow any
more money from the first mortgagee." This additional phrase
makes the hypothetical do the work Cranworth asked of it. If the
first mortgagee agrees that no further advances will be made on
the security of the mortgage, the second mortgagee will become
the third-party beneficiary of that promise and will be able to
enforce it. In substance, the first mortgagee's agreement is tantamount to a subordination to the second mortgage with respect to
any further advances on the first loan. A Florida District Court of
Appeal recently reached precisely this conclusion in a case in
which the first mortgagee had specifically agreed to make no more
advances.
99. NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Barnett Bank, 560 So. 2d 360, 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
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The difficulty is that the general law of contracts provides no
mechanism by which the mortgagor or the junior mortgagee can
compel the first mortgagee to join in their agreement that no
additional funds will be drawn on the first loan. That is the missing element in Lord Cranworth's logic, and it is precisely the element that the cutoff notice statutes supply; under these statutes, a
first mortgagee that receives a cutoff notice has no choice. Unless
the first mortgagee is exempted from the notice because of the
sorts of special conditions discussed above, it is bound by the
notice whether it likes it or not.
If the statutes can supply this element of compulsory concurrence by the first mortgagee, court-made caselaw can do so equally well. Except in the limited situations in which fairness requires
that the mortgagee be exempt from cutoff notices, it is perfectly
proper and highly desirable for the courts to hold cutoff notices
binding on senior mortgagees whether they expressly agree to be
bound or not. A court might rest this conclusion on the estoppel
argument discussed above, but it is critically important that the
conclusion not rest on a detailed finding of some particular degree
of actual reliance by a subordinate lienor. To be effective in practical terms, the notice must be binding per se, and the courts must
clearly announce it as being so. No junior lender will be willing to
take the risk of litigating whether its actual reliance was sufficient,
so if the rule binding the senior lender to the notice is not absolute, junior lenders will not lend and the whole purpose of the
cutoff notice concept advocated here will be defeated.
There is ample precedent in other real estate and mortgage
law contexts to support the judicial adoption of a notice requirement despite the absence of any statutory mandate. Indeed, one of
the elements of the common law optional/obligatory doctrine (a
doctrine that we propose to abandon) is notice to the senior lender of the existence of intervening liens."° In addition, state
courts frequently impose notice requirements in the context of
mortgage acceleration."' 1 The Texas Supreme Court, for example,

100. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
101. See, e.g., Smith ex rel. Coe v. Piluso, 719 P.2d 33, 34 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Ogden
v. Gibraltar Say. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233-34 (Tex. 1982); cf. Shumway v. Horizon
Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 894-95 (Tex. 1991) (holding that note provision allowing
mortgagee to accelerate "without prior notice or demand" was effective to waive the
mortgagor's right to presentment and notice of acceleration, but not to waive notice of
intent to accelerate).
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recently announced the judicial doctrine that "[n]otice of intent to
accelerate is necessary in order to provide the debtor an opportunity to cure his default prior to harsh consequences of acceleration
and foreclosure."' 1 2
Another illustration is found in the law of installment land
contracts, in which courts over the past several decades have formulated the rule, without statutory authorization, that a vendor
who has actual knowledge of a mortgage on the vendee's interest
may not declare a forfeiture of an installment contract without
giving the vendee's mortgagee both notification of intent to forfeit
and an opportunity to protect itself."3 Some courts have taken
the position that even when the vendor lacks actual knowledge of
the vendee's mortgagee, recording by the latter constitutes constructive notice to the vendor of the mortgagee's existence." Finally, judicially imposed notice requirements are significant for
mortgage lenders under the law of subrogation. Most courts hold,
for example, that a lender who loans money to pay off a senior
mortgage will be denied subrogation and priority with respect to
an intervening lien if the lender has actual knowledge of that lien
when it makes the loan. 0 5

102. Ogden, 640 S.W.2d at 234.
103. See, e.g., Credit Fin., Inc. v. Bateman, 660 P.2d 869, 871 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983);
Lockhart Co. v. B.F.K. Ltd., 691 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Stannard v.
Marboe, 198 N.W. 127, 127 (Minn. 1924); Fincher v. Miles Homes, Inc., 549 S.W.2d 848,
857 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Yu v. Paperchase Partnership, 845 P.2d 158, 166 (N.M. 1992);
Kendrick v. Davis, 452 P.2d 222, 227 (Wash. 1969) (en banc).
104. See, e.g., Stannard, 198 N.W. at 127; Recent Developments, Mortgages-Notice-Vendor and Purchaser-VendorNot Charged with Constructive Notice of Subsequent Mortgage of Contract Purchaser'sEquity-Mortgagee Required to Notify Vendor to
Protect Security Interest-Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 470, 452 P.2d 222 (1969),
45 WASH. L. REv. 645 (1970) (discussing the overruling of Norlin v. Montgomery, 367
P.2d 621 (Vash. 1961), which held that recording constitutes constructive notice).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Baran, 996 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying New
York law); Han v. United States, 944 F.2d 526, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying California law); In re Hubbard, 89 B.R. 920, 923 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1988); Herberman v.
Bergstrom, 816 P.2d 244, 247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Martin, 49 S.W.2d 1046, 1047-48 (Ark. 1932); Smith v. State Say. & Loan Ass'n, 223
Cal. Rptr. 298, 301 (Ct. App. 1985); Rusher v. Bunker, 782 P.2d 170, 174 (Or. Ct. App.
1989); Pee Dee State Bank v. Prosser, 367 S.E.2d 708, 713 (S.C. 1988); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 7.6 (Tentative Draft No.

4, 1995) (taking the view that lack of notice of the intervening lien is not critical to the
payor's right of subrogation).
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As these examples show, there is no great novelty in a court's
imposing a notice requirement in the interest of fairness even
when no statute so dictates.
B. Elements of a Judicial Doctrine
The beginning point for a judicial doctrine of future advances
incorporating the cutoff notice concept is the premise that all
future advances, irrespective of their optional or obligatory nature,
take the priority of the original mortgage. No distinctions among
types of advances are needed, since the mortgagor's opportunity to
obtain additional financing will be protected by the right to issue a
cutoff notice.
The mortgagor's notice can take the form of either a request
to refrain from making further advances (thereby effectively terminating the future advances clause in the mortgage) or a request to
subordinate all future advances to any and all intervening interests.
The Restatement Tentative Draft recognizes either form of notice
as effective."° From the mortgagor's viewpoint, either suffices to
make the real estate attractive to a prospective junior lender.
Some mortgagors may prefer subordination to elimination of future advances, since it is conceivable that a mortgagor who issues
a cutoff notice may wish to return to the lender at some future
time, borrow additional funds, and have repayment secured with a
third or fourth priority on the real estate. However, this possibility
is usually remote, and in any event it presents the lender with a
different sort of loan arrangement than it originally agreed to.
Hence, the lender should have the right to treat a "subordinating"
cutoff notice as a "terminating" notice if the lender wishes, thereby eliminating any risk that the lender might be called on subsequently to make advances with a junior priority.1"
A cutoff notice does not eliminate the mortgage security for
whatever balance is owing on the debt at the time the notice is issued; by its nature, the notice operates only prospectively. More106.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 2.3(b) (Tenta-

tive Draft No. 1, 1991). Most of the statutory cutoff notice procedures assume that the
notice will terminate the future advances clause, but a few indicate that it will merely
subordinate future advances. See supra text accompanying note 82-83.
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 2.3(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991) ("If the mortgagor requests a subordination with respect to further advances, the mortgagee may elect to treat the request as one to refrain from making further advances.").
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over, interest that accrues on that balance will continue to be
secured notwithstanding the cutoff notice. But beyond these elementary principles, what exceptions should courts recognize to the
mortgagor's power to issue a cutoff notice?
First, no lender should be compelled to recognize a cutoff of
future advances if doing so would unreasonably jeopardize the
security for advances already made. The Restatement Tentative
Draft adopts this standard.' The most obvious illustration, discussed earlier in this Article, is a construction loan on a partially
completed project.'" A cutoff notice might well leave the mortgagee with inadequate security and no control over the completion
of the work, which may indeed never occur. The lender could, of
course, require the borrower to covenant to complete the project,
and even to do so entirely with funds from the original loan, but
it is unlikely that a court would enforce such a covenant with any
remedy other than damages. In many cases, a remedy of damages
would be uncollectible against the project's developer. Hence the
courts should refuse to recognize cutoff notices that present these
risks to construction lenders. Some of the statutes .simply exempt
construction loans from cutoff notices,"0 but this approach seems
overbroad; in many cases the borrower may be able to establish
beyond serious doubt that firm arrangements have been made to
complete the project with other funding. A more sensible approach
is to ask, on a case-by-case basis, whether cutting off the construction loan will in fact unreasonably jeopardize the original lender's
security.
In addition, a cutoff notice should not operate against advances made by a lender to protect its security. Such advances include
those made to pay delinquent taxes, casualty insurance premiums,
condominium or homeowners association assessments, ground
rents, and other similar charges. In addition, advances may be
made to repair waste to the improvements or to protect the property from physical damage from the elements. In general, these

108.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF PROPERTY-SECURITY

(MORTGAGES)

§ 2.3(c)(1)

(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991).
109. See supra text accompanying note 85. A home improvement loan or other loan
given to finance modifications of a building can raise the same issue. See TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-28-109(3) (1988) (involving home improvement loans).
110. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04(1)(b) (West Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 443.055(3)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.23.2(C) (Baldwin
1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-28-109(3).
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advances for protection fall into two classes: those necessary to
protect the value of the real estate and those necessary to prevent
the assertion of prior liens. Widely accepted common law principles permit a mortgagee to add the amounts of such advances to
the lien of the mortgage, whether the mortgage itself contains a
future advances clause or not."' The borrower's issuance of a
cutoff notice should not deprive the mortgagee of its security for
these protective advances.
Similarly, mortgage documents routinely permit lenders to
include the costs of collection of the loan in the amount secured
by the real estate. These costs may include attorney's fees, court
costs, advertising expenses, and the like. They might be regarded
as future advances, but in all events should be exempt from the
operation of a cutoff notice in order to give the lender the benefit
of its bargain.
A second general exception to the borrower's cutoff notice
power must be recognized. Mortgages often secure the mortgagor's
obligation to reimburse the mortgagee's performance of a duty to
a third party. A common example, discussed earlier in this Article," 2 is a letter of credit issued by a bank to a third party on
behalf of a real estate developer; the developer's duty to reimburse the bank if it is called on to pay the letter of credit is secured by a mortgage on real estate. Since the bank cannot escape
the duty to pay the letter of credit, it would plainly be unjust to
permit a cutoff notice to deprive the bank of the security for its
reimbursement. Numerous other examples involving guaranties,
surety bonds, endorsements of instruments, and other undertakings
to third parties can be envisioned. In any case in which a lender's
advances will benefit a party other than the mortgagor, and a
lender has a contractual duty to provide that benefit, the lender
must be free to disregard the cutoff notice. The Restatement Tentative Draft so provides." 3
The mechanics of cutoff notices warrant some consideration.
The statutes vary widely; some require that notices be delivered by
registered or certified mail," 4 but most refer merely to "filing"
111.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 2.2 (Ten-

tative Draft No. 1, 1991).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
113.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF PROPERTY-SECURITY

(MORTGAGES)

§

2.3(c)(2)

(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991).
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04(1)(b) (West Supp. 1995) (certified mail); ME. REV.
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with or "delivery" to the mortgagee." 5 Large institutional lenders
may argue that more specificity is needed in defining the mode of
delivery, since otherwise the borrower may tender the notice to an
employee who has nothing to do with the loan in question, perhaps works in a different location from that where the loan is
administered, and will not pass the notice along to the relevant
administrator. This problem is not unique to cutoff notices, however; all sorts of legal notices to lenders are subject to being mishandled in this way, and lenders must be responsible for training their
employees to deal with notices correctly. Even an oral cutoff notice should be effective, at least in principle, although a well-advised lender would doubtless insist that the oral statement be
confirmed in writing, and a court should uphold that insistence.
Borrowers, on the other hand, need from the cutoff notice
process a document executed by the lender, showing that it has
received and accepted the cutoff notice, and further showing the
balance owing on the loan at the time it was "locked in" by the
notice. Without this evidence, a borrower may face serious difficulties in convincing a prospective junior lender that the notice is
in effect. Moreover, efficiency requires that the lender's certificate
be in recordable form, for recording it will afford constructive
notice to all subsequent lenders by a single stroke. Most cutoff nofice statutes provide for some sort of recordation. Some require6
recordation by the mortgagee of a certificate or statement,"
others provide for recordation of the cutoff notice itself by the
mortgagor (and require no certificate by the mortgagee at all)," 7

STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 505(5)(A) (West Supp. 1994) (registered mail); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 86.155(3) (1988) (certified mail); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-25-11 (1984) (registered or

certified mail).
115. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.055(6) (Vernon Supp. 1994) ("filing"); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 71-1-206(3) (1993) ("delivery"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238.01(1)(a) (1990) ("filing");
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.380(1) (Michie 1994) ("delivery"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5301.232(c) (Baldwin 1986) ("delivery"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-28-105(b)(1)(A)
(1988) ("service"); ALASKA STAT. § 06.30.560(1) (1988) (repealed 1993) ("filing"), repealed by 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 26, § 102.
116. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.055(6); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.380(2); see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-72 (1991) (providing that the mortgagee's certificate is "entitled" to registration but not stating who is to record it).
117. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04(1)(b) (West Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 505(5)(A) (West Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-206(3); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 76-238.01(1)(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.232(c); TENN. CODE ANN. §
47-28-105(b)(1)(B); ALASKA STAT. § 06.30.560(1) (1988), repealed by 1993 Alaska Sess.
Laws ch. 26, § 102.
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and some permit recordation by the mortgagor only if the mortgagee fails in its duty to record a certificate.118
The most sensible approach, and the one we recommend for
purposes of a judicially created cutoff notice procedure, is to require the lender to provide a certificate showing that the cutoff
notice has been received." 9 Merely recording the cutoff notice
itself does not show receipt, and a subsequent lender that sees a
recorded cutoff notice has no way of knowing whether it was
actually delivered to the senior lender. Future advances lenders are
not held to constructive notice of such recordings, for to do so
would impose an intolerable burden on them to examine the title
before every advance. 2 Thus a two-step process is needed, under which the mortgagor issues the cutoff and the lender is obligated to respond with the recordable certificate. There is no need
for the lender to record the certificate; the borrower can do so if
she wishes.
Some of the statutes require that the lender's certificate state
the "capped" balance of the loan. 2 ' This is unnecessary, however, since lenders have a general legal duty, affirmed by statute
in many states, to provide loan balance information at the
borrower's request at any reasonable time." It is doubtful that a
junior lender would wish to rely on the statement of the balance
appearing in a senior lender's recorded cutoff certificate if any
appreciable time had elapsed since that certificate was recorded;
the junior lender would simply request (or have the borrower
request) a current statement instead.
VI. CONCLUSION

The notion of a judicially created cutoff notice system is not
as radical as it may first appear. Courts in real estate matters
frequently adopt notice systems that do not originate in any stat-

118. MO. ANN. STAT. § 443.055(6); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.380(3); OR. REV.
STAT. § 86.155(5) (1989).
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 2.3(b) (Tenta-

tive Draft No. 1, 1991).
120. See Giorgi v. Pioneer Title Ins. Co., 454 P.2d 104, 106 (Nev. 1969).
121. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.055(2); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.380; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 45-72 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.155(4)(a) (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 34-25-4 (Supp. 1994).
122. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 1.6 (Ten-

tative Draft No. 1, 1991) and cases and statutes cited therein.
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ute.1" Indeed, one of the elements of the common law optional/obligatory doctrine itself is notice to the senior lender of the
existence of intervening liens. While that doctrine has functioned
poorly, it illustrates the courts' creativity in fashioning a system
that relies on notice but that has no statute to bolster it. The
alternative system we have advocated here is hardly more drastic,
but it has the ability to work far more smoothly and effectively,
and to generate far less peripheral litigation. We believe it is worthy of adoption by the courts... in jurisdictions in which the legislatures have not already acted.

123. For example, subrogation of a third mortgagee that pays off a first mortgage.
124. The cutoff notice system was approved in dictum, with a citation to the Restatement, in Shutze v. Credithrift of Am., Inc., 607 So. 2d 55, 63 & n.13 (Miss. 1992); Mississippi has no statute on the subject.
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